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ABSTRACT 
The South African government has indicated that the National Small Business Act of 
1996 had failed to get the small business sector working successfully as engine for 
growth. Thus, government policy measures, using an institutional network alone, to 
create a thriving SME economy, has not succeeded. The Minister called for small 
business and other institutions to develop suggestions for inclusion in a new business 
strategy document. 
One such strategy, as proposed by this thesis, involves the introduction and 
implementation of the Venture Capital Schemes (VCS) Framework. The purpose of 
the dissertation is to conduct an exploratory study of the VCS framework and to 
determine if the VCS framework is worthwhile pursuing in South Africa, following 
its successful introduction in the United Kingdom. 
To achieve effective implementation of the VCT framework, specific issues to the 
various components and key players require addressing: 
• Are there potential high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked? 
• Is there a definite 'equity gap' to satisfy the needs of potential SMEs that is 
not being serviced? 
• Are there sufficient investors who can be attracted to fund this 'equity gap'? 
• Are there sufficient rewards for the private sector financial institutions 
(venture capitalists and associated network) to be willing to manage and drive 
the VCT framework? 
To obtain the required information, a discussion / interview was conducted with 
Business Partners Limited - East Fund (a leading South African venture capitalist 
who is involved in both 'pure' venture capital funding as well as having integral ties 
with SMEs). 
The Venture Capital Schemes Framework, in theory, appears to be a viable option. 
However, the response indicates that the larger venture capital / private equity firms 
will not be willing to drive the VCS framework, since it requires an adjustment to 
their investment philosophy. The response has also indicated that a RFI with a 
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reasonable network of resources, operating as a private company, will be in the best 
position to drive the VCS framework. It will also be able to attract competition from 
the smaller venture capital/private equity firms, accounting firms and business 
advisors, to create a vibrant VCT market (industry). Hence, a thriving SME economy 
could become a reality. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Preamble 
The South African Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Irwin, stated at the 13th annual 
conference ofthe Southern African Entrepreneurship and Small Business Association 
in Johannesburg in August 2001 that the National Small Business Act of 1996 had 
failed to get the small business sector working successfully as engine for growth. The 
Minister called for small business and other institutions to develop suggestions for 
inclusion in a new business strategy document. 
It is against this background that an academic inquiry (MBA [Strategic Financial 
Management] Thesis) has been initiated. The object of the investigation will be to 
ascertain if the Venture Capital Schemes (VCS) framework as applied to the United 
Kingdom (UK), with the necessary modifications, can be introduced to South Africa. 
1.2. Background to the problem 
A major challenge facing the South African government is how best to use its finite 
resources to support Small Medium Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) or entrepreneurship, 
and how its overall support interfaces with access to finance and the role of private 
financial institutions in service provision. 
A major challenge is to ensure that that if:firms become viable entities on the non-
financial side (display growth potential), then the financial market (both public and 
private sectors) should not prejudice them should they require finance. 
The 1995 White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of 
Small Business in SA has been the first major effort by the South African government 
to design a policy framework particularly targeting the entire spectrum of small 
enterprise sector. 
The overall objective of the strategy was to create an enabling environment for 
SMME growth. In response to the challenges set out in the White Paper, a four-
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pronged new institutional network at national level were established to drive the 
National Small Business Strategy. 
The originally well-intended policy measures suffered from sub optimal 
implementation. General distrust to external agencies among SMMEs on the one 
hand, and the incapacity of support institutions to persuasively raise awareness about 
their existence and effectiveness on the other, are said to lie at the heart of the 
problem. Moreover, the poor coordination of services results in a replication of 
services, and clustering of institutions in urban areas. 
Thus, government policy measures, using an institutional network alone, to create a 
thriving SME economy, will not suffice. To this end, the private sector financial 
institutions (venture capitalists and associated network) should be invited to work 
alongside the institutional network with lured incentives to create a competitive small 
firm economy. 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
The South African government has been unable to foster a thriving entrepreneurial 
spirit despite its valiant attempts and support initiates to help steer small business to 
greater success rates. In short, South Africa does not have a booming SME 
economy. 
The poor success of small firms, have been researched partially, the broad problem 
areas, weakness and shortcomings are listed below: 
1. The problem lies in the small firms themselves, that is the SMME economy 
lacks ambition and drive (entrepreneurial spirit) in the quest to pursue growth 
11. The problem lies in the area that there are insufficient growth prospects in the 
offering to small firms. 
lll. The problem lies in the area of financial intermediation services to potential 
high-growth firms, both financial services (funding constraints, that is 
potential high-growth firms are not receiving the financial aid they require to 
enable them to grow) and non-financial services (additional skills and 
managerial services provided by business advisors) are lacking. 
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In 1995, the United Kingdom (UK), launched the Venture Capital Schemes 
Framework (yCS), a policy strategy devised by the Inland Revenue Services in 
collaboration with the key players, to provide solutions to alleviate some ofthe 
problems, weakness and shortcomings mentioned in the three categories listed above. 
The objectives of the Venture Capital Schemes are: 
1. The immediate objective of the schemes is that the tax incentives provided by 
the EIS and the VCT scheme should improve the post-tax returns for 
investors, thereby encouraging them to invest more in the companies covered 
by the schemes (i.e. the schemes should increase the supply of finance). 
2. The intermediate objective of the schemes is that the companies should then 
be enabled to use the funds (coupled with managerial advise) to improve their 
performance. 
3. The ultimate objective is that the UK. economy should benefit by having a 
more competitive small firms economy. 
The UK. has been able to implement the VCS framework, with a modest level of 
success, in creating a competitive small firms economy. The main issue arising is 
why South Africa has not considered such a framework as part of its policy 
strategy, to create a competitive smaU firms economy. 
The main objective of the study is to determine, from an exploratory basis, if the VCS 
framework can be applied to South Africa along similar lines as the UK. to achieve 
similar goals, that is, to foster a thriving SME economy, providing solutions to some 
of the problem areas, weaknesses and shortcomings, mentioned above. The qualitative 
approach to the study, in a limited scale, will attempt to gain an appreciation of the 
workings of the VCS framework. The study will attempt to unearth factors that limit 
(hinder) its application in South Africa, which can be used for consideration in a more 
detailed study. 
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1.4. Purpose of the Dissertation 
The government has indicated that the National Small Business Act of 1996 had 
failed to get the small business sector working successfully as engine for growth. 
Thus, government policy measures, using an institutional network alone, to create a 
thriving SME economy, has not succeeded. The Minister called for small business and 
other institutions to develop suggestions for inclusion in a new business strategy 
document. 
One such strategy, as proposed by this thesis, involves the introduction and 
implementation of the Venture Capital Schemes (VeS) Framework. The individual 
components of the VCS Framework can be phased in over a period of time. In 
essence, the government reduces its responsibility of creating a thriving SMME 
economy and pass some of the responsibility over to the private sector financial 
institutions (venture capitalists and associated network), individuals and companies in 
exchange for incentives (tax breaks, etc). 
The purpose of the dissertation is to conduct an exploratory study (using qualitative 
methods) of the ves framework and to determine if the VCS framework is 
worthwhile pursuing in South Africa. The qualitative approach to the study, in a 
limited scale, will attempt to gain an appreciation of the workings of the VCS 
framework. The study will also attempt to unearth filctors (if any) that limit its 
application in South Africa, which can be used for consideration in a more detailed 
study. 
In this study, the VCS framework will be limited to one component only, namely 
Venture Capital Trusts (VeT). The other components, namely, Enterprise Investment 
Scheme (EIS) and the Corporate Venturing Scheme (CVS) will not be studied since it 
shares similarities with the VCT and may complicate the study. However, references 
will be made to it to achieve clarity and completeness. 
In order to apply the VCT framework, the various components and key players need 
to be identified and address issues specific to the various components and key players. 
The issues that need to be addressed are: 
• Are there potential high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked? 
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• Is there a definite 'equity gap' to satisfY the needs of potential SMEs that is 
not being serviced? 
• Are there sufficient investors who can be attracted to fund this 'equity gap'? 
• Are there sufficient rewards for the private sector financial institutions 
(venture capitalists and associated network) to be willing to manage and drive 
the VCT framework? 
The answers to these issues and questions will revolve around a discussion focussed 
interview with a leading South African venture capitalist who is involved in both 
'pure' venture capital funding as well as having integral ties with SMEs. 
The limitation of the research study is that it will only generate sufficient awareness 
and light on the topic of Venture Capital Schemes. This is the deliberate intention of 
the research, since it merely proposes to understand the key issues which may be 
further investigated for preparing a strategy (for implementation) to create a thriving 
SME economy or to uncover reasons as to why it cannot be implemented. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The South African Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Irwin, stated at the l3th annual 
conference ofthe Southern African Entrepreneurship and Small Business Association 
in Johannesburg in August 2001 that the National Small Business Act of 1996 had 
failed to get the small business sector working successfully as engine for growth. The 
Minister called for small business and other institutions to develop suggestions for 
inclusion in a new business strategy document. 
It is against this background that an academic inquiry has been initiated. The inquiry 
specifically addresses the viability of the introduction ofVCS to South Africa, to 
create a thriving SME economy in South Africa. 
2.2 Literature Review Format 
2.2.1. Framework ofVCS as applied to the UK 
2.2.1.1 Summary ofVCS explaining the objectives, rules and regulations. 
2.2.1.2 The effectiveness ofVCS in UK since its introduction (Inland 
Revenue research report) 
2.2.2 Assessment of the effectiveness of South Africa's institutional support 
network to assist SMEs 
2.2.3 Models and approaches for SMEs to pursue growth 
2.2.3.1 Perren - Factors in the growth of micro-enterprises 
2.2.3.2 Porter - Diamond on National Competitive Advantage 
2.2.4 Secondary data analysis of SMEs 
2.2.5 Secondary data analysis as to who will serve as VCT managers 
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2.2.1.1 Summary of the Venture Capital Schemes 
This section of the work draws on experiences ofthe UK goverrunent policies for 
creating a thriving SME economy. It attempts to draw parallels between the SA SME 
economy and the UK SME economy at the time of implementation of the Venture 
Capital Schemes. It shall also assess the different components and criteria required for 
the implementation ofthe VCS. 
The rationale for implementation of the Venture Capital Schemes is that smaller, 
unquoted companies find it difficult to raise external equity finance for one or more of 
the following reasons: 
1. Information costs. 
The costs to an investor of obtaining the information needed to appraise the 
risks and expected returns from an investment tend to be high, relative to the 
size of investment, in the case of smaller companies. 
2. Asymmetric Information and principal! agent problems. 
A business owner is likely to be better placed than prospective external 
venture capitalists to assess the prospects for hislher business. The latter might 
wish to compensate for this by seeking higher returns and exercising a degree 
of control over how the business is run. However, entrepreneurs may be 
reluctant, to dilute their control by bringing in external equity. As a result, 
profitable investment and growth opportunities may be forgone. 
3. Inexperienced management. 
Entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers etc. who wish to exploit their ideas 
commercially may lack managerial skills, making external investors reluctant 
to put in funds. The EIS allows for the possibility of investors taking a 
managerial role in a company, following their investment. Similarly, a VCT's 
managers may have more influence than an individual investor could have 
over how a company receiving funds is run. 
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Objectives of the Schemes 
Both the VCT and EIS schemes have similar broad objectives: 
1. The immediate objective of the schemes is that the tax incentives provided 
by the EIS and the VCT scheme should improve the post-tax returns for 
investors, thereby encouraging them to invest more in the companies 
covered by the schemes (i.e. the schemes should increase the supply of 
finance). 
2. The intermediate objective of the schemes is that the companies should 
then be enabled to use the funds (together with assistance from business 
advisors) to improve their performance. 
3. The ultimate objective is that the UK economy should benefit by having a 
more competitive small firms economy. 
It becomes evident from the rationale and objectives of the UK VCS that the South 
African SME economy has similar problem areas and shortcomings (as discussed in 
the problem statement) to that ofits UK counterpart. 
The key players in the VCS framework are: 
• Investors (individuals wrt VCT and EIS and companies wrt CVS) 
• Qualifying companies (potential high-growth SMEs requiring finance) 
• V CT managers (venture capitalists and associated network who will drive the 
VCT framework 
What is now required, is to determine if the key players can be found in South Africa 
and the extent to which each of them can satisfY their requirements in the creation of a 
VCS in SA. 
The full literature review giving a brief outline of the four schemes and the 
participants of each scheme, together with the rules and regulations of the schemes, is 
presented in Appendix 1. It also includes pertinent facts about investor profiles and 
investor expectations. Also included are sections of assistance to VCT managers, 
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namely, development of the VCT market, the VCT investment remit and performance 
of the VCT funds. These sections will provide valuable guidance and enhance the 
requirements and expectations ofVCT managers. 
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2.2.1.1 The effectiveness of VCS in UK since its introduction 
Comprehensive research into the Enterprise Investment Scheme and Venture Capital 
Trusts was undertaken by PACEC (public and Corporate Economic Consultants) of 
the UK. The research results were published in April 2003, almost nine years after the 
introduction of the schemes. 
The objectives of the research were to: 
1. Provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the effects of the schemes on 
the supply of finance to smaller, higher risk, trading companies; 
2. Provide information on how investing companies have used the funds that 
they may have raised through the schemes and on what difference this has 
made to their financing and performance; and 
3. Provide a first evaluation of the wider economic effects of the schemes and 
their cost-effectiveness. 
A summary of the report is presented in the following format: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 







Characteristics of investors and companies involved in 
the schemes 
Effects of the schemes on investors and the supply of 
finance 
Effects of the schemes on companies 
The role of advisors 
The wider economic effects of the schemes 
Overall conclusions on the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of the schemes 
This section of the review provides a basis for the discussion/interview with potential 
VCT managers and what modifications will be necessary to implement such a scheme 
in South Africa. 
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Summary of report 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The report sets out the results of research into the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) and the Venture Capital Trust (VCT) scheme, undertaken by PACEC for the 
Inland Revenue. 
Both schemes provide tax incentives to individuals to encourage the supply of equity 
finance to smaller, unquoted, trading companies. The EIS was introduced in January 
1994 and the VCT scheme was introduced in April 1995. The former provides reliefs 
to investors' direct equity holdings in qualifying companies, whereas the latter 
provides reliefs for indirect portfolio investments administered by professional fund 
management companies. It is intended that the tax reliefs should encourage investors 
to increase the supply of finance to companies that might otherwise have difficulties 
in obtaining it, and that those companies should be able to improve their performance 
as a result. 
A cumulative total of nearly £2.2 billion was invested through the EIS between its 
launch and tax year 2000/01. The equivalent amount invested through the VCT 
scheme between its launch and 2000/0 I was just over £ lA billion. The cumulative 
cost of the EIS to the public purse, in terms of tax forgone, was £750 million to the 
end of 2000/0 1. The equivalent for the veT scheme was £400 million. 
The schemes share broad objectives. 
The immediate objective is that the tax incentives provided should improve the post-
tax returns for investors, thereby encouraging them to invest more in the companies 
covered by the schemes. 
The intermediate objective is that the companies should then be enabled to use the 
funds to improve their performance. 
The ultimate objective is that the UK economy should benefit by having a more 
competitive small firms economy. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
In summary, the review found that the last decade has seen the introduction and 
reinforcement of a number of related policy initiatives designed to improve the 
flow of debt and equity finance to smaller, start-up, younger, and high-tech 
SMEs. This has coincided with an apparent amelioration of reported constraints, 
arising from financial markets, on the growth and performance characteristics of 
these finns. However, major areas of uncertainty remain in relation to the impact 
of particular schemes such as EIS and VCT, on which there is virtually no 
empirical evidence in the literature. The current research, therefore, fills an 
important gap in knowledge. 
Chapter 3: Characteristics of investors and companies involved in the schemes 
The research showed that EIS investors are slightly younger and less likely to be 
retired than their VCT counterparts. The two groups are similar in terms of their 
income, but EIS investors are more dispersed than VCT investors in terms of their 
wealth distnbution. The comparison group investors (who were a sample of self-
assessment tax payers with similar characteristics to scheme investors in terms of tax 
liability and income) comprised a greater proportion of females and pre-retirement 
age people than both of the other groups. Even though they had similar levels of 
income, the comparison group investors were also markedly less wealthy than both 
EIS and VCT investors, even though they have similar levels of income. 
It was also found that there are two distinct types of EIS investors, and that the two 
types have different investment patterns from one another. 'Deferral-only' EIS 
investors (i.e. those attracted into the scheme mainly or solely to access the 
opportunity to defer their liabilities on other capital gains) tend to invest significantly 
more than 'mainstream' EIS investors (who are attracted into the scheme for a variety 
of tax and non-tax reasons). 
Overall, EIS companies are smaller, younger and less likely to be listed on AIM 
or OFEX than VCT companies, but both groups are equally ambitious to grow. 
Comparison group companies (who were a group ofSMEs with similar 
characteristics as in-scheme companies in terms of size and sector, and were 
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eligible to use the schemes) are older, less likely to be listed and less growth-
orientated than both groups of in-scheme companies. 
Reflecting their larger size, VCT companies had raised more finance through their 
scheme than the EIS companies had. They were also more likely than EIS 
companies to describe themselves as 'going for growth'. Conversely, they were 
less likely to be start-ups. High-tech EIS and VCT companies were not found to 
be greatly different from their conventional technology counterparts, in terms of 
their background characteristics and financing patterns using the schemes. But 
they were less likely to descn1>e themselves as mature. 
Chapter 4: Effects of the schemes on investors and the supply of finance 
This chapter considered a number of questions related to the objective that the 
schemes should improve the supply of finance to eligible companies: 
• How much ofthe finance provided through the schemes was additional 
(i.e. would not have been invested anyway)? Depending on the scheme 
and precisely how the calculations are made, it is estimated that between 
52% and 87% of the finance provided through the schemes, would not have 
been invested in small, unquoted companies anyway by those investors, if 
the schemes had not existed. 
• What features of the schemes encouraged investors to invest? What 
have been the discouraging features? What have been the relative 
compliance costs? Taking all investors together, the single most attractive 
feature of both schemes is the front-end income tax relief. However, 
secondary attractive features differ according to type of scheme and, to a 
lesser extent, according to sub-group of investor. The single most 
unattractive feature is the qualifying period for tax reliefs. Measured in 
terms of difficulties in understanding and complying with scheme rules, the 
relative compliance costs of the VCT scheme do not appear to be great, 
although they are great for a sizeable minority of EIS investors. 
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• What has been the impact of changes to scheme rules? Few EIS investors 
and a minority ofVCT investors claimed to be aware of changes to scheme 
rules. However, amongst those aware, the effect of the changes has, if 
anything, made investors more positive in their attitudes towards the 
investing through the schemes. 
• Bow do investors plan their exit strategies? About half of the investors 
who have given the matter thought are likely to hold on to their scheme 
shares beyond the end ofthe qualifying period. However, only just over half 
of EIS investors, and fewer than four in ten VCT investors, have actually 
considered the issue. 
• Bow have rates of return on scheme investments compared with returns 
on comparable investments? Post-tax rates of return on EIS investments 
have compared unfavourably with rates of return on comparable 
investments, although this is not the case for all sub-groups of investors. On 
balance, post-tax rates of return on VCT investments have been about the 
same as those on comparable investments. 
• Would investors invest through the schemes again? Despite the fact that 
EIS investors appeared to have had relatively poor experiences of the 
scheme, more than two-thirds of both groups of investors said that, assuming 
they had the funds available, they would consider investing through the 
schemes again. 
Chapter 5: Effects of the schemes on companies 
In relation to the intermediate objective that schemes should enable companies to 
improve their performance, the principal findings can be summarised as follows: 
• To what extent have the schemes provided benefits over and above the 
supply of finance, e.g. increased expertise from investors? Nearly half of 
the EIS companies and nearly four in ten VCT companies indicated that 
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using the scheme enabled them to attract investors or fund managers who 
also provided them with business advice and expertise. This extra support 
was generally described as extremely or very helpful. There was also 
evidence to suggest that obtaining finance through the schemes then enables 
some companies to obtain other external finance, which they had not 
previously been able to obtain. 
• What has been the impact of the schemes on company performance in 
terms of profitability, productivity, survival etc.? Objective econometric 
analysis ofthe survey data concluded that use of the schemes had a positive 
impact on companies' growth. The companies' subjective assessments of the 
impact of the schemes on a range of performance indicators, was also 
positive, but quantitatively small. 
• How has the impact varied according to type of company (e.g. sector, 
size)? 
Many variations in the survey results according to sub-group of companies 
were found, although the variations noted did not always have obvious 
interpretations. Moreover, there was not the same consistent pattern in the 
variations amongst companies as there was in the variations amongst 
investors. However, measured in terms ofthe number of statistically 
significant survey findings, VCT companies do appear a slightly more 
homogeneous group than EIS companies. 
• To what extent are the effects and impacts of the schemes on companies 
additional (i.e. would not have happened in the absence of the schemes)? 
The additionality of the supply of EIS and VCT finance to companies was not 
measured in the same ways as the additionality of the supply offinance from 
investors was measured, although there were strong suggestions of 
additionality. Instead, the focus was on the additionality of companies' actions 
associated with raising finance through the schemes. At first sight, this type of 
additionality did not appear to be great, but there is reason to believe that 
simple measurements understate its degree. 
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It is also worth noting that both sets of companies' implied satisfaction ratings are 
high and that, consequently, attitudes towards using the schemes again are generally 
positive. Companies indicating that they are unlikely to use the schemes again, or 
expressing doubts on the matter, often show signs of having outgrown the schemes. 
Chapter 6: The role of advisors 
The findings from advisors were, by and large, consistent with the findings from 
investors and companies. But, focusing on instances where the results from the survey 
of advisors conflicted with equivalent results from the surveys of investors and 
companies, the main findings ofthis chapter can be summarised as follows: 
• Advisors perceive the attractions of the schemes to investors in broadly the 
same way that investors themselves perceive them. But they tend to under-
estimate the importance ofloss relief to EIS investors, and of tax-free 
dividends and the portfolio nature of the scheme to VeT investors. 
• Advisors think. that the VeT scheme is the more difficult of the two to 
understand, but the investors implied the opposite. 
• Advisors' perceptions of rates of return on VCT investments (compared to 
rates of return on other investments) were similar to VeT investors' own 
perceptions, but they over-estimated comparative rates of return on EIS 
investments. 
• The advisors also under-estimated the extent to which VCT companies are 
able to satisfy their objectives in being involved in the scheme. 
• Overall, the advisors' attitudes towards using the schemes again in the future 
were more positive than those of the companies. 
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Chapter 7: The wider economic effects of the schemes 
The overall conclusion drawn from this chapter is that there are wider benefits 
associated with the schemes and that any wider disbenefits do not appear to be great. 
The other key findings are that: 
• The rationale for the schemes was valid during the period considered by 
this research. 
• The schemes do not play a major role in the overall supply of funds to 
SMEs, but they play a significant and growing role in the supply of private 
equity funds in the UK. 
• The schemes appear to be reasonably effective in targeting the companies 
for which they were intended. 
• The schemes are associated with important supply-side gains, a 
substantial proportion of which are additional (Le. would not accrue 
anyway). 
• The substitution and displacement effects associated with the schemes 
appear to be moderate. 
Chapter 8: Overall conclusions on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
the schemes 
Assessing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the schemes proved to be 
hazardous, and it was necessary to attach caveats to many of the cost and effect 
estimates. In the absence of performance targets and external benchmarks, the report 
compares the two schemes with one another, even though they operate under different 
rules and aim to address different needs. Nonetheless, the key conclusions may be 
summarised as follows: 
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• Effectiveness of the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
Because more than half of the monies invested would not have been invested by those 
same investors in the absence ofthe scheme, the EIS is adjudged to have satisfied its 
immediate objective to an extent. The additionality of finance through the EIS has 
been lower than through the VCT scheme partly because the EIS scheme has attracted 
a significant minority of investors who would probably have invested anyway to 
support friends and acquaintances. Concerning the intermediate objective, it was 
found that EIS companies were changed and affected positively in a range of ways as 
a result of the scheme; and that many of them would not have taken alternative action 
to secure the same benefits, if they hadn't been able to use the scheme. As a result of 
the changes and effects reported, there were moderate improvements in company 
performance for a sizeable minority of firms. It was also found that the effects of the 
EIS on firms were of the sort that would lead to competitiveness improvements, rather 
than short-term, one-off, gains. There were also positive spill-over effects into the 
wider economy, and any negative internal and external effects appeared to be 
moderate. Thus, it is concluded that the EIS has gone some way towards satisfying its 
ultimate objective. 
• EtTectiveness of the Venture Capital Trusts scheme 
The large majority of the monies invested would not have been invested by those 
same investors in the absence of the scheme. The VCT scheme is, therefore, adjudged 
to have satisfied its immediate objective to a large extent, although some companies 
invested in could have got the finance from elsewhere. Despite the differences 
between the schemes in terms of the ways firms used the finance raised, the effect of 
the VCT scheme on company performance was not greatly different from the effect of 
the EIS. Consequently, it is concluded that the VCT scheme has been fairly effective 
in relation to its intermediate objective. There was little to distinguish between the 
two schemes in terms of their effects on small firm competitiveness and the UK 
economy. Thus, it is concluded that the VCT scheme has also gone some way towards 
satisfying its ultimate objective. 
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• Cost-effectiveness of the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
The estimated cost of the EIS in tenns of tax forgone has been 55-66 pence for every 
additional £1 invested through it. In relation to the effects ofthe scheme on company 
performance, it was shown that for every £1 million in tax forgone EIS companies are 
estimated, amongst other things, to have increased their sales turnover by £3.3 million 
and have increased their employment by 65 jobs. However, without external 
benchmarks, it is difficult to say how good a performance this represents. 
• Cost-effectiveness of the Venture Capital Trusts scheme 
The equivalent data for the VCT scheme implied that its estimated cost in tenns of 
tax forgone has been 33-41 pence for every additional £1 invested. The VCT scheme 
seems to be significantly more cost-effective than the EIS, but the respective 
estimates relate to the amount of money invested through the schemes, rather than to 
the amounts supplied immediately to small firms. Conversely, it was also shown that 
the VCT scheme appeared to be less cost-effective than the EIS in tenns of its effects 
on company performance (for every £1 million in tax forgone, VCT companies are 
estimated, amongst other things, to have increased their sales turnover by £0.6 million 
and have increased their employment by 9 jobs). However, it was also cautioned that 
the data were likely to have exaggerated the cost-effectiveness of the EIS relative to 
that of the VCT. 
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2.2.2 Assessment of the effectiveness of South Africa's institutional support 
network to assist SMEs 
The 1995 White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of 
Small Business in SA has been the first major effort by the South African government 
to design a policy framework particularly targeting the entire spectrum of small 
enterprise sector. 
The overall objective ofthe strategy was to create an enabling environment for 
SMME growth. In response to the challenges set out in the White Paper, a four-
pronged new institutional network at national level were established to drive the 
National Small Business Strategy: 
• The Centre for Small Business Promotion (CSBP) of the DTI 
• National Small Business Council (NSBC) 
• Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency (Ntsika or NEP A) 
• Khula Enterprise Finance. 
The originally well-intended policy measures suffer from sub optimal 
implementation. General distrust to external agencies among SMMEs on the one 
hand, and the incapacity of support institutions to persuasively raise awareness about 
their existence and effectiveness on the other, are said to lie at the heart of the 
problem. Moreover, the poor coordination of services results in a replication of 
services, and clustering of institutions in urban areas. 
The specific problems mentioned below are discussed in the Trade and Industrial 
Policy Strategies (TIPS) draft report "The Economics ofSMMEs in South Africa", 
February 2002, Cassim et al, Pages 38-39. 
• No outreach to SMMEs 
• Uneven distribution of services 
• High search costs of service provision 
• Cumbersome administration and discontinuity of programmes 
Apart from these general findings, research evidence about the shortcomings of 
specific programmes is critical for their revision. Such analysis could reveal, for 
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example, whether the low usage of a specific support programme is an indicator of its 
low relevance to SMMEs. The reasons for only few SMMEs approaching support 
institutions despite being aware of them need to be explored. 
The general findings indicate that the institutional support network to assist SMEs 
needs to be revised. Cassim et al. have also made an observation that South African 
SMMEs have seemingly neither developed a culture to use private consuhants and 
tend to underestimate the usefulness of these services. 
Appropriate revisions and recommendations should be adopted along the following 
lines: 
i. Ntsika should be tasked with compiling a comprehensive SME directory. The 
SME directory should the criteria of age, sector, location, size, background, 
growth potential, ownership details and types of finance seeking should it be 
required 
11. Khula and the The Enterprise Organisation (TEO) should focus on 
• The identification of types of enterprises that are relevant for SME finance 
purposes (according to the criteria of age, sector, location, size, 
background, growth potential) and the main types of finance to consider 
(equity, short-term and long-term debt). 
• For each type of enterprise, the identification of the average demand for 
various types of external capital, according to their growth potential, their 
current financial structure, and typical capital intensity. The desirable 
upgrade of a certain number of companies into the next higher category 
should also be considered in the model 
• The analysis should also include "product market/demand" based on 
geographic regional scale (focusing also on rural and semi-urban areas) on 
what enterprises are favourable (for both 10caVdomestic demand and 
export demand). 
• The data of this section of the potential high-growth SMEs should also 
form part of the Ntsika database. Hence, Ntsika, Khula and the TEO will 
actively follow a programme of resource sharing. 
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111. Khula and the TEO should be given the mandate to create a thriving and 
competitive SME sector (as part of the National Small Business Strategy) 
using the criteria of section ii above. It should be allowed to directly compete 
or at least form partnerships with the private sector financial institutions 
(venture capitalists and associated network). 
IV. The private sector financial institutions (venture capitalists and associated 
network) should be given access to the Ntsika directory to reduce the 
information and search costs of locating potential high-growth SMEs. 
The SMME Policy Framework in post apartheid South Africa is discussed in-depth in 
the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) draft report "The Economics of 
SMMEs in South Africa", February 2002, Cassim et al, Pages 33-47 and 
downloadable from the website www.tips.org.za. A summary of the description of the 
South Africa's SMME Support Network is given in Appendix n. 
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2.2.3 Models and approaches for SMEs to pursue growth 
It has become evident that only SMEs that display growth potential are likely to 
attract capital, and more especially appeal to venture capitalists to raise equity finance 
on their behalf. SMEs that are frequently denied access to equity capital should revise 
their business plans and incorporate a growth strategy that will appeal to suppliers of 
finance or at least get their attention. Two such 'models and approaches' is presented 
in this review: 
• Factors in the growth of micro-enterprises: Developing a framework and 
exploring the implications by Lew Perren, 1996, PhD Thesis - University of 
Brighton 
• National Competitive Advantage: Porter's Diamond by Michael Porter of 
Harvard Business School 
2.2.3.1 Factors in the growth of micro-enterprises: Developing a framework and 
exploring the implications 
The research examines the micro-enterprises pursuing gradual growth. The research 
findings develop an empirically verified framework that explains how growth is 
influenced by a myriad of interacting factors. This leads to a discussion of the policy 
implications of the framework and explores the managerial implications of the 
framework. Also the research can be applied to small firms to pursue gradual growth. 
A summary ofthe paper (including the empirically verified framework) is shown in 
Appendix ITI. A very brief summary is presented below. 
MANAGERIAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
• Four interim growth drivers influence micro-enterprise development: owner's 
growth motivation, expertise in managing growth, resource access and 
demand. 
• The interim growth drivers are in turn influenced by a myriad of independent 
factors. 
• The framework provides micro-enterprise owner-managers and their advisers 
with a checklist of potential compensating factors for each of the interim 
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growth drivers. This should provide an agenda for stimulating growth beyond 
the micro-enterprise phase. 
• Micro-enterprises need timely and tailored support, rather than any form of 
standard supply-side policies, which will be wasteful and not address real 
needs. What is needed is support that is owner-manager centred, rather than 
adviser-centred. 
• The diagnostic toolkit provides micro-enterprise owner-managers and their 
advisers with a systematic way of exploring the influences on the interim 
growth drivers and highlighting ways of compensating deficits in particular 
factors. 
• Adopting a Socratic questioning approach helps unleash owner-managers' 
intimate knowledge about their businesses and empowers them to think 
creatively about growth opportunities. 
• Owner-manager centred approaches like this should be encouraged, as they 
can help develop diagnostic skills and self-awareness. They may also reduce 
the risk of over dependence on external advisers. 
2.2.3.2 National Competitive Advantage: Porter's Diamond 
Although this thesis was written with an international focus, it does however have 
implications for SMEs pursuing growth. Such SMEs need to place themselves in 
context of the big picture and see how they fit in, if they are to aim for the top of 
success ladder. Also, government is a major player in this theory. Furthermore, this 
theory is a reasonable starting point for Khula and TEO to assess potential high-
growth SMEs. 
The theory essentially examines why a nation achieves success international success 
in a particular industry. Porter's thesis is that four broad attributes of a nation shape 
the environment in which local firms compete, and the attributes promote or impede 
the creation of a competitive advantage. These four attributes are Factor endowments, 
Demand conditions, Related and supporting industries, and Firm strategy, structure, 
and domestic rivalry, which constitutes the diamond. 
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Porter maintains that two additional variables can influence the national diamond in 
important ways: chance and government. Chance events, such as major innovations, 
create discontinuities that can unfreeze or reshape industry structure and provide the 
opportunity for one nation's firms to supplant another's. Government, by its choice of 
policies, can detract or improve national advantage. For example, regulation can alter 
home demand conditions, antitrust policies can influence the intensity of rivalry 
within an industry, and government investments in education can change factor 
endowments. 
Porter's argument is that the degree to which an industry (enterprise) will achieve 
success is a function ofthe combined impact of Factor endowments, Demand 
conditions, Related and supporting industries, and Firm strategy, structure, and 
domestic rivalry. 
Government can influence each of the four components of the diamond either 
positively or negatively. Factor endowments can be affected by subsidies, policies 
towards capital markets, policies towards education, and the like. Government can 
shape domestic demand through local product standards or with regulations that 
mandate and influence buyer needs. Government policy can influence supporting and 
related industries through regulation and influence rivalry through such devices as 
capital market regulation, tax policy and antitrust laws. 
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2.2.4 Secondary data analysis of SMEs 
In the application of the Venture Capital Schemes (VCS) with respect to the rationale 
and objectives, two important issues concerning SMEs need to be addressed in order 
to effectively implement the VCS: 
• Are there high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked by suppliers of 
finance? 
• Is there an equity gap to service the needs of SMEs? 
Although much research has been done on SMMEs, very little has been done in 
relation to addressing the above issues and providing reasonable conclusions. 
The TIPS draft report, ''The Economics of SMMEs in South Africa" by Cassim et al, 
February 2002, incorporating the 1999 World Bank survey, have reviewed South 
Africa's SMME structure with respect size, profile and performance with the intention 
of providing an explanation of the lack of impact of policy measures thus far, and to 
put forward new suggestions. A summary of the relevant information is presented in 
AppendixV. 
The review did not receive sufficient information, to warrant any conclusions. Also, 
Cassim et al has indicated SMEs lack the necessary expertise and skills (and 
manpower) to identifY the role they play in the terms of the national economy. 
Moreover, support institutions tasked with the responsibility ofidentuymg 
prospective enterprises that show growth potential, may have also have fallen short of 
their task. 
However, a more focused research output should consider the following: 
• The identification of types of enterprises relevant for SME finance purposes 
(according to the criteria of age, sector, location, size, background, growth 
potential) and the main types of finance to consider (equity, short-term and 
long-term debt). 
• For each type of enterprise, the identification of the average demand for 
various types of external capital, according to their growth potential, their 
current financial structure, and typical capital intensity. The desirable upgrade 
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of a certain number of companies into the next higher category should also be 
considered in the model. 
2.2.5 Secondary data analysis as to who will serve as VeT managers 
This section of the review addresses the most important component ofthe VCT 
framework, that is, who will serve as VCT managers and drive the VCT framework? 
Also, do they have necessary skills and expertise, and more importantly, what 
relationship do they have with the SME economy? 
The information of this section is drawn from: 
1. KPMG and the Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association. 2001 Private Equity Survey. April 2002. 
2. Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA). 
Directory 2002. 
Although KPMG's background research identified 74 companies that potentially may 
be classified as private equity firms or are involved in the management of private 
equity funds, it is not specified as to which companies conduct deals with SMEs. 
Their research shows that South Africa's private equity industry boasts total funds 
under management ofR35.3 billion (inclusive ofundrawn commitments ofR8.4 
billion. 
The venture capital/private equity sector, hence, is not small in South Africa. But, 
considering that ''private equity" includes all equity investments in non-listed 
companies, the size of the sector is not necessarily an indicator of the importance of 
equity as a source of finance for SMEs. Although very little evidence is available in 
this area, there is a strong presumption that only a small portion is directed to SMEs 
(presumably less than R5 billion). 
At present, venture capital is under-developed on the SMME segment, because of 
both a lack of interest of many venture capital firms, and a lack of readiness of 
SMMEs. Entrepreneurs tend to be discouraged from when they consider the need to 
give up a part of the control on what they consider to be their ownership. 
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Investments 
Private equity investments in portfolio companies reduced from R3.6 billion in 251 
companies in 2000 to R2.3 billion in 259 companies in 2001. The number of new 
investments increased from 207 in 2000 to 216 in 2001 . The average new deal size 
has deceased from R15.1 million to R9.5 million reflecting the number and value of 
larger buy-out transactions. 
Venture Capital providers - SAVCA Membership Directory 
SA VeA distinguishes its membership between full members and associate members. 
Full membership 
Full membership is open exclusively to organisational units or persons defined as 
venture capitalists and/or private equity investors: 
• Who can prove substantial activity in the management of equity or quasi-
equity financing for the start-up and/or development of enterprises that have 
significant growth potential in terms of products, technology, business 
concepts and services; 
• Whose main objective is long term capital gains to renumerate risks; 
• Who can provide active management support to investees. 
Associate membership 
Associate membership is open to persons or companies representing a special interest 
group that can influence the development of venture capital and private equity in 
Southern Africa. 
Persons eligible to become Associate members include, but are not limited to banks, 
development capital organisations, consultants, lawyers, accountants, financial 
advisers and stockbrokers, pension funds, insurance companies, development 
organisations and associations, private individuals and national associations for 
venture capitalists. 
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Full member association with SMEs 
There is no concise information in this respect. Using only the 'minimum investment' 
as a guide, and limiting this amount to R2 million suggests that 30 of the 69 full 
members may have any involvement with SMEs. Also an important consideration in 
the application of the VCT framework is what and how involvement Full Member VC 
providers have with individuals in raising their finance. This information is presented 
in Appendix VI. 
Associate member association with SMEs 
There is no concise information in this respect. The 2002 SA VCA directory lists 23 
associate members that may have any involvement with SMEs. Also an important 
consideration is what and how much involvement Associate Member VC providers 
have with individuals in raising their finance as well as in the provision of business 
advisory services. The information presented in Appendix VII contains a summary of 
the Associate member listing and the core services they provide. 
Finally, should the venture capital / private equity firms serve as VCT managers, it 
may necessitate a revamp of the venture capital industry in terms of information and 
communication channels. Richard Harrison and Colin Mason have done substantial 
work in this area. The collective work (including those of co-workers) has been 
presented in a set of complete papers titled "Evaluating the impact of business 
introduction services - Informal Venture Capital". A synopsis is presented in 
Appendix VIII. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The literature review has shown that the VCT scheme consists of three components 
(key players), namely: 
• Investors, 
• SMEs, and 
• VCT managers. 
Although all three players contnbute and are essential for the implementation of the 
VCT scheme, it rests with the VCT managers to: 
• Attract investors who will supply the funds, and 
• Find potential SMEs to which the funds can be applied. 
Hence, the objective ofthe research, that is to determine if the introduction of Venture 
Capital Schemes (VCS) framework to South Africa is viable or not, need only be 
determined from the perspective of the VCT managers. To this end, the South African 
Venture Capital Association was examined in the literature review to determine if its 
members and/or associates could fit the role ofVCT managers. The review showed 
that it would be difficult (beyond the scope of an MBA dissertation) to obtain a 
statistically representative sample of potential VCT managers, since a true population 
does not exist. Hence, no hypothesis is tested. 
It is for this reason that the exploratory route of investigation (embodying the case 
study method) was chosen as the preferred method to test the objective of the 
research. The method of data collection ( qualitative methods) involved the use of a 
structured discussion type interview with a potential would-be VCT manager, with the 
intention of obtaining the following responses: 
• Provide answers / responses to the questionnaire as if the VCT framework was 
already implemented, that is, how their firm will go about using the VCT 
framework to obtain the maximum benefits for their firm, 
• Prompt the respondent to provide reasons (fuctors) as to why the VCT 
framework should or cannot be implemented from their perspective as well as 
in general, with the use of additional issues and questions (not included in the 
questionnaire), 
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• Prompt the respondent to provide recommendations as to whom they consider 
to be ideal veT managers to drive the VeT framework (ifnot themselves) 
and, 
• Prompt the respondent to provide recommendations as to what the ideal veT 
framework should constitute and consider. 
To enable the respondent to answer the questionnaire with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy, and also to meet the requirements ofan acceptable feasibility determination, 
the structured questionnaire together with relevant and additional information, for 
example, the rules and regulations governing veTs was given to the would-be veT 
manager two weeks in advance, in order that the would-be VeT manager obtain some 
degree offamiliarity with the VeT framework. 
The number of potential VeT managers was reduced to one from thirty candidates 
(refer to Appendix VI), namely, Business Partners Limited - East Fund, using the 
following short-listing criteria: 
• VeTs operate through a medium of funding via individuals. At present only 
eight candidates obtain funding from individuals, 
• To eliminate bias of whether a generalist or focussed veT would be 
implemented, candidates displaying industry preferences were eliminated. 
This reduced the number of candidates to only four. 
• Finally, the VeT would service a certain geographic area to reduce (minimize) 
its operating costs. In this regard, only one would be in a position to service 
the needs of the Kwa-Zulu Natal provincial region, the other three being 
located in the Gauteng province. 
The survey instrument being the questionnaire was divided into eight sections with 
statement type questions. The responses for the questions employ the Likert rating 
scale and forced ranking scale technique. The questionnaire design with would-be 










The marketing and the identification of investors, and attractive 
features of the scheme that will appeal to investors 
Marketing and the identification of potential firms (high growth and/or 
ability to generate high returns) and attractive features that will appeal 
to firms 
Supply of finance 
Management of firms 
Scale and Nature of Deals 
Rates of return 
General 
Other comments/observations with regard to the rationale and 
objectives of the VeT scheme. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESUL TS (Findings and Discussion) 
4.1 Questionnaire design and Response 
The questionnaire together with the responses of the with would-be (potential) 
VeT manager, is shown below. 
Section 1: Marketing and the identification of Investors and attractive 
features of the scheme that will appeal to investors. 
Question 1. Which of the following methods would you use to identify 
investors? 
(rank and assign % probability usage) 
1. IF As, accountants and stockbrokers (with a commission) 
2. Intermediaries 
3. Direct advertising in the financial press 
4. Targeted mailshots to individual investors 
5. Exhibitions and roadshows 
6. Other 
Response: Business Partners (BP) prefers e-mails to prospective clients. 
On average, usage will be in the order of < 30% 
Question 2 What type of investor would you prefer to att ract? 
1. High net worth individual 
2. High income earner 
3. Any earner 
4. Any individual who wishes to use the scheme 
Response: Business Partners (BP) prefers that the initial marketing and 
introduction to the public at large, will be undertaken by the 
administrators of the scheme (SARS). Unsure, but at present many 
High net worth individuals use the services provided by BP. 
33 
Question 3 Features of the VeT scheme that will be most attractive to 
investors? 
1. Front-end income tax relief 
2. CGT deferral for gains on other assets 
3. Exemption from capital gains in share value 
4. The size of the investment that attracts tax relief 
5. Prospects of tax-free dividends 
6. Investments are in a managed portfolio offirms 
7. Not sure 
8. Other 
Response: Not sure. BP prefers that upfront mass marketing be used so that 
investors will be in the position to decide for themselves if there are any 
attractive features. Will vary from client to client. 
Question 4 Features of the VeT scheme that will be most unattractive to 
investors? 
1. The limit on the rate of tax relief 
2. The limit on the size of the investment that attracts tax relief 
3. The type of company that can be invested in 
4. Difficulty in complying with scheme rules 
5. The time period required to hold shares for tax relief 
6. The absence of tax relief on shares that are sold at a loss 
7. None of the above - no particular unattractive features 
8. Not sure 
9. Other 
Response: Not sure. BP prefers that upfront mass marketing be used so that 
investors will be in the position to decide for themselves if there are any 
unattractive features. Will vary from client to client 
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Question 5 How easy or difficult do you think it is for investors to understand 
and conform to the rules of the schemes? 
1. Easy - there are no problems using the scheme 
2. Average - any difficulties are as expected of the schemes 
3. Difficult - some difficulties with rules and procedures 
4. Very difficult - rules are difficult to understand/comply with 
Response: Difficult to very difficult It depends on how mass media markets the 
concept 
Question 6 Generalising, how would you say this scheme would compare with 
your clients other equity investments? 
1. Less risky 
2. No more risky 
3. More risky 
4. Not sure yet 
5. Don't know - not assessed 
Response: Difficult to say, since all equity investments are risky. 
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Section 2. Marketing and the identification of potential firms (high growth 
and/or ability to generate high returns) and attractive features that 
will appeal to firms 
Question 7 Which of the following methods would you use to identify firms? 
(rank and assign % probability usage) 
1. Industry contacts (inhouse or external) 
2. Accountants and banks 
3. Already known clients 
4. Universities 
5. Aggressive methods - active research staff to spot 
potential investments 
6. Consultants! other professional advisors 
7. Chamber of Commerce / Trade Associations 
8. Business Support agency 
9. Other 
Response: Cu"ently BP uses refe"als network. BP is more often approached by 
prospective clients. BP uses charted accounting firms as its own 
intermediaries to monitor and control the accounting aspects of the firm 
and to serve as BP's representatives on thefirm's management team and 
to report to BP. 
Question 8 How easy or difficult do you think it is for firms to understand and 






Easy - there are no problems using the scheme 
Average - any difficulties are as expected of the schemes 
Difficult - some difficulties with rules and procedures 
Very difficult - rules are difficult to understand/comply with 
Difficult to very difficult 
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Question 9 What do you consider to be the main purpose of firms requiring 
Finance - hence issuing VeT shares 
(rank and assign % probability usage) 
l. To provide working capital 
2. To finance Research & Development 
3. As part of a management buy-out or buy-in 
4. To finance the purchase of plant and machinery 
5. To finance the purchase of another business 
6. To finance the purchase of buildings 
7. To finance the purchase of other assets 
8. To clear a bank overdraft 
9. To use in a company intending to float 
10. Other 
Response: Difficult to say as to what it actually might be, but from experience very 
often involves working capital, purchase of buildings and purchase of 
plant & equipment BP works on a restructuring process, and would not 
assist in the purchase of plant & equipment, since this an area for the 
banks to finance, since it can hold the plant & equipment as security. 
With regards to buildings it would fund it 100%. 
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Section 3: Supply of finance 
Question 10 VeTs should fill a gap primarily in both the equity and debt 
market that is not filled by other investors, such as business angels 
and 'pure' venture capitalists. What 'range of amount - Rmillions' 












Here it depends on each VeT's investment philosophy. BP's range is 
R150 k to R15 million for cu"ent deals. It will in all probability use 
the same range since it has accumulated vast experience and 
handling of such deals. 
Question 11 To what extent do you think the scheme will improve the overall 
supply of finance to small, higher risk, unquoted trading 
companies 
l. To a great extent 
2. To a significant extent 
3. To a small extent 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
Response: Don 't really know, but 'gut feel ' suggests to a 'small extent' 
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Question 12 To what extent do you think the scheme will improve the quality of 








To a great extent 
To a significant extent 
To a small extent 
Not at all 
Don't know 
Not at all, since BP will apply the same policy as it cu"ently does 
with all its equity investments. 
Question 13 Generalising as far as possible, to what extent do you think the 
expectations of companies raising finance through the scheme will 
be satisfied? 
1. Expectations wholly or largely satisfied 
2. Expectations partly satisfied 
3. Expectations satisfied to a small extent 
4. Not applicable - investments have no particular expectations 
Response: Not applicable - investments have no particular expectations other 
than to obtain funding. Anything over and above this is considered a 
bonus. 
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Section 4 Management of firms 
Question 14 To what extent do you think the scheme will improve the strategic 
and management support for these firms (eg. presence on the 







To a great extent 
To a significant extent 
To a small extent 
Not at all 
Don't know 
To a significant extent, BP normally funds deals with sound viability 
and management team. Its' intermediaries who monitor and control 
on their behalf, will provide on-going support 
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Question 15 In your opinion, what do you consider the main way a firm will be 
changed or affected as a result of raising finance by issuing VeT 
shares? 
(rank and assign % probability usage) 
l. Free up finance for other development 
2. More ambitious to grow 
3. Invest more in R & D 
4. Increase capital expenditure 
5. Lever in further development finance 
6. Change / improve marketing activities 
7. Improve efficiency in other ways 
8. Reduce company's debt 
9. Launch new/improved product/service 
10. Strengthen management team 
11. Innovate in other ways 
12. Acquire intellectual property to exploit 
13. Improve quality of products/service 
14. Reduce costs 
15. Buy in additional expertise 
16 Improve skills of non-managerial workforce 
Response: Here to, it will largely depend on a matter of restructuring. 
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Section 5: Scale and Nature of Deals 
Question 16 What size of fund (R millions) would you ideally prefer to raise 
and manage to attain the best returns for both yourselves and 
investors? 
1. < 10 
2. 10- 20 
3. 20 - 30 
4. 30 -40 
5. > 40 
Response: It is difficult to say with certainty, since each deal will vary in its 
risk/return profile and the size of the investment. Currently BP East 
Fund manages a fund in excess of R300 million. 
Question 17 What type of VeT fund would you prefer to establish and what 
the reasoning be? 
1. Generalist (investing in firms across a range of sectors, such as media, 
retailing and engineering firms at a growth stage), or 
2. Specialist (focussing, for example, on high tech sectors and early stage 
businesses) 
Response: It will definitely be a specialist fund but more inclined towards a 
focussed fund utilising the experience of the investment manager of 
a specific sector. It may also not include high-tech sector since high-
tech sector have shown great swings in performance and 
sustain ability into the future may be difficult to predict 
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Question 18 What would the typical number of firms in the fund be? 
1. < 10 








It is difficult to say with certainty, since each deal will vary in its 
risk/return profile and the size of the investment The number of 
firms in its portfolio will be i"elevant, since BP appoints 
intermediaries (accountants and advisors) on its behalf to monitor 
and control activities at managerial and board representation. 
Question 19 What would the make~up structure of the firms in your fund be 
like, and the reasoning thereof! 
1. small, higher risk, unquoted trading companies 
2. small quoted trading companies on the AltEx (1 st October 2003) 
3. combination of both (specify % mix) 
Response: Any type of company provided it has good accounting control and 
monitoring. 
Question 20 What would the nature of the deal with individual firms be like, ie 
ratio of debt to equity provided to investee firms and its structure? 
(equity, debt, dividends and board fees) 
Response: It will depend on each individual deal, and a generic policy will not 
be enforced 
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Question 21 Would the participation in younger and high tech firms be skewed 
towards equity financing and re-investment, so reducing the "cash 
burn", Yes! No and reasoning? 
Response: High-tech firms pose a significant risk and may consider of not even 
going there. 
Question 22 Would the participation in older and more mature firms be 
skewed towards debt financing and dividends, to provide a return 
and hedge against risk, Yes! No and reasoning? 
Response: 
Section 6: 
No. Will evaluate the merits of each mature firm in terms of: 
• innovation and transformation (are they showing any signs) 
• ownership/management styles - is there going to be a change, 
for example from father to son in a family-owned business. 
Rates of return 
Question 23 What will your likely portfolio consist of: 
1. Potential high performers (say, 10 - 20 %) 
2. Average performers (say, 70 - 80 %) 
3. Poor performers and! or will be liquidated (say, 10 - 20 %) 
Response: BP targets returns in the region 26% to 49%. Will depend on the 
firms and the deal they can strike. More than likely target above 
average performers. 
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Question 24 What management fee in % p.a. gross assets would you seek to 
take? 
Response: 1. 5% 
Question 25 What will the target overall rate of return to the VCT, taking 
account of equity, debt, dividends, board fees and VCT fees (all 
elements) range be like in % per annum for the following funds? 





Generalist (eg. 25 - 30%) 
Buy-outs (eg. 20 - 25%) 
Specialist [early stage high tech] (eg. 40 - 50%) 
26% to 49% 
Lower limit - 26% - to cover GP margins 
Upper limit - 49% - not to take on too much risk 
This range applies to individual deals and based on risk/return 
profiles. 
Question 26 What is the expected time frame in years to achieve the stated 
returns mentioned in Question 25? 
Response: The projections will be cash flow based To a large extent will depend 
on the nature of the deals. Time frame - as short as possible. 
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Question 27 What do you consider the primary exit routes to be? 





Buy outs with potential buyers 
Listing on the AltEx for small firms 
Response: Will depend on the market, but more often will involve Trade sales. 
Section 7 General 
Question 27 In UK, VeT fund managers strike, on average, twenty deals per 
one thousand potential firms. The deals (which take 4 to 6 
months to complete) and price of shares (following due diligence) 
reflect values at the time and future growth prospects, potential 
future buyers and market values. How do you see the situation in 
SA? 
Response: BP operates on a similar investment philosophy as 3i. Not sure. From 
own experience it may be similar to UK It will also depend on 
investment philosophy of other VeT managers. 
Question 28 Do you consider potential high growth smaU firms in SA 
approachable? 
Response: Yes. From April 2003 to August 2003, has received 76 enquiries from 




Other comments/observations with regard to the rationale and 
objectives of the VeT scheme. 
The VeT scheme provides incentives, for investors in the form of tax 
breaks, for firms in the form that they have to comply with the rules, 
what incentives are there for the VeT companies apart from the 
managementfees they receive? Will there be tax breaksfor VeT 
companies to create willingness to drive the scheme? 
4.2 Responses to additional questions / issues not included in the questionnaire 
In addition to the specific questions addressing the framework ofVCTs, the following 
four issues were put forth to the respondent: 
1. Are there potential high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked? 
2. Is there a definite 'equity gap' to satisfy the needs of potential SMEs that is 
not being serviced? 
3. Are there sufficient investors who can be attracted to fund this ' equity gap'? 
4. Are there sufficient rewards for the private sector financial institutions 
(venture capitalists and associated network) to be willing to manage and drive 
the VCT framework? 
The response to each of the four issues is as follows: 
Issue 1: Are there potential high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked? 
Response: 
The response was a positive Yes. The reasoning was illustrated via an example, and 
Business Partners' investment appraisal rating methodology, as follows: 
1) Viability 
2) Management 
3) Owner' s Equity 
4) Shareholding (to be acquired by Business Partners) 
The small company required funding for RI million. Although the firm had sound 
management, the viability of its product and market was untried and untested (in spite 
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of a proper business plan. The firm was highly geared, its own contribution (equity) 
was low. Also, its security was very poor, almost nil. Hence, BP cannot fund such a 
request since it will make BP the major shareholder (BP does not exceed 49% 
shareholding). Although the ROI is very good, IRR > 40%, the financial risk is too 
high (the firm could easily suffer financial distress). 
Issue 2: Is there a definite 'equity gap' to satisfy the needs of potential 
SMEs that is not being serviced? 
Respondent: There exists a huge segment of the market that is 'untried and 
untested' 
Issue 3: Are there sufficient investors who can be attracted to fund this 
'equity gap'? 
Respondent: Yes. There may also exist sufficient foreign investors who may show 
interest. Foreigners may want to provide assets (equipment and 
machinery) instead of funds. 
Issue 4: Are there sufficient rewards for the private sector financial 
institutions (venture capitalists and associated network) to be 
willing to manage and drive the VeT framework? 
Respondent: Yes and No. 
Arguments for Yes: 
• 
• 
In excess of 30% IRR may be earned, 
Earnings may even be 'blue sky', industry terminology of 
expressing> 100% IRR earned. 
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Arguments for No: 
• Small firms are characterised by liquidations and sequestrations 
• Poor management 
• Very low levels of education in terms of business management 
• Will have to alter their investment philosophy to accommodate the 
VCT framework, which is highly unlikely. 
4.3 Discussion of findings 
4.3.1 Findings of the questionnaire response with Business Partners Limited 
Section 1: The marketing and the identification of investors, and attractive 
features of the scheme that will appeal to investors 
The respondent has indicated that the launch ofthe VCT framework should be task of 
the administrators of the scheme. The marketing and education of investors, 
highlighting the features and attractiveness of the scheme should be mass marketed. 
Thus much of the upfront marketing costs will be borne by the administrators. 
The VCT managers will then continue with the marketing of their individual funds. 
Section 2: Marketing and the identification of potential firms (high growth and/or 
ability to generate high returns) and attractive features that will appeal to firms 
The same response/answer as for section 1 was given. 
Section 3: Supply of finance 
• This is a untried and untested market 
• Will depend to a large extent on VCTs investment philosophy, in BP's case, it 
varies between R150 000 to R15 million 
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• Companies expectations that VCTs may exercise leniency and relax its 
investment policy and rules and may become more risk tolerant (but this pure 
speculation. 
Section 4: A!anagementofjirms 
The scheme will to a significant extent improve the strategic and management 
support. However, it will involve restructuring. 
Section 5: Scale and Nature of Deals 
• The deals will be individual in nature and assessed on its own merits and 
funding requirements. The total number of firms in the fund will not be 
problematic, since outsourced accountants and advisors will monitor and 
control activities at board level 
• The size of the fund will not be an issue since cash flow and roll over of funds 
will be of more importance 
• Accounting reporting and control will be of paramount importance to VCT 
managers 
Section 6: Rates of return 
Although Business Partners will be targeting 26% to 49%, they fear that actualised 
returns may be far less, since small firms to a large extent falsify accounting reports, 
and at present there is insufficient checks and balances in place by accounting and 
auditing bodies. 
Section 7: General 
Although potential high-growth firms in South Africa are approachable. UK is a 
developed country (1 st world) and South Africa, a developing country (3rd world), 
hence South Africa, may experience its own set of unique problems. 
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Section 8: Other 
veT managers are concerned that there are no incentives for them apart from the 
management fees, to drive the veT framework. Hence, they may not be willing, since 
they are profit driven. 
Overall Response of Business Partners Limited - East Fund 
The respondent has indicated that their investment policy may not allow them to them 
to become a VeT manager for the following reasons: 
• They are to a large extent, profit driven. Managing a VeT fund may not be in 
the best interests of their shareholders 
• The VeT fund will create conflicts in their current investment policy, and the 
conventional venture capitaVequity firm will have to operate with two sets of 
policy directives. 
• The VeT fund will cater for a unique equity gap (see figure 1), comprising an 
untried and untested segment of the market. This in itself will pose unique 
and high risks, which a conventional venture capitaVequity firm normally 
tries to stay away from. 
Figure 1: Firm size profile 
Small I Equity gap fur VeTs 
I Micro 
Survivalist 
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However, the respondent has stated that they may be prepared to start a separate 
company under the parent company umbrella. The VCT firm, will be structured 
around a limited partnership basis involving its current investment executives, and 
accountants and business advisors (which it normally outsource), provided there is 
already a VCT market in place. 
4.3.2 Recommendations of respondent as to ideal VeT manager, suitable for 
the VeT implementation 
The respondent has also indicated that the VCT scheme should be launched and 
implemented by Khula through its Retail Financial Intermediaries (RFIs), based on 
the following recommendation. The RFI should partner with The Enterprise 
Organisation (TEO) or a portion of it and register as a private company with a new 
mandate exclusively for driving the VCT framework. This new company (privatised 
RFI) should also consider forming a partnership with an established (accredited and 
recognised) accounting consulting firm and business advisory firm. It could also 
consider outsourcing these functions ifunable to form a partnership or alliance. The 
privatised RFI will essentially have a successful network that will be in a position to 
implement the VCT scheme. The impact will also be enhanced since it will be given 
sufficient incentives such as profit sharing schemes and state subsidised grants. The 
recommendation is based on Business Partners own experience and success since it 
was also an RFI under Khula before being privatised. 
4.3.3 Further issues to explore 
From the previous sections of discussion, certain issues are emerging, namely, what 
are the underlying reasons for Business Partners Limited, not being in a position to 
becoming a VCT manager: 
• Could it possibly be that operating costs (costs to evaluate and appraise SMEs, 
accounting & auditing costs of their investments in SMEs, etc.) is too high? 
• Could it be that financing costs and gross profit margins ofVCT fund 
managers are too high (in terms of interest rates) as compared to UK 
counterparts? 
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These issues need to be explored further with quantitative assessments, prior to the 
launching of the VeT scheme. 
4.3.4 Targets and benchmarks for the VeT market to strive towards 
The implementation of the VeT scheme, if properly launched and marketed by the 
privatised RFI, could within a short period, receive competition from the private 
sector accounting firms and business advisors, who would be enticed to become VeT 
managers, competing for market share. The larger venture capital / private equity 
firms may also come on board should the market be lucrative. 
The aim of launching the VeT scheme in South Africa should be to create as large 
and diverse as possible a veT market with the largest possible number offunds. 
Should this be achieved, the South African veT introduction would be in a position 
to show similar gains for SMEs and the economy as a whole as the UK counterparts 
within a few short years. These gains are demonstrated by means of the following two 
illustrations: 
1. Impact of the schemes on the overall supply of venture capital funds in the UK 
2. Generation of wider economic spillovers by the schemes 
1. Impact of the schemes on the overall supply of venture capital funds in the UK 
Table 1 shows that since their introduction, the VeT and EIS schemes combined have 




The share of EIS and VCT investments in the total supply of private equity in the UK 
Year 1) Total supply of 2) Amounts invested 3) EIS and VCT 
private equity in the through EIS and VCT investment as share of 
UK, £ million scheme, £ million total private equity 
(2 as % of 1) 
1991 989 - -
1992 1251 - -
1993 1231 4 0.3 
1994 1668 41 2.5 
1995 2140 213 10.0 
1996 2806 264 9.4 
1997 3066 303 9.9 
1998 3775 455 12.1 
1999 6189 830 13.5 
2000 6371 1490 23.4 
Source: PACEC Research Report, page 131 
• It should also be cautioned that the term ' total supply of private equity' is believed to mean 
the amount of equity finance provided to unlisted companies from formal venture capital 
sources, rather than the amount of equity finance provided from all private sources. 
2. Generation of wider economic spillovers by the schemes 
The econometric analysis of the VCT scheme undertaken by PACEC, on company 
performance, showed that there was a significant scheme impact on company asset 
growth. It also showed a range of beneficial effects likely to impact on the economy 
as a whole. For example, each of the following changes and effects (listed below) 
were attributed to scheme finance by sizeable minorities of companies in both the EIS 
and VCT scheme: 
• Strengthened company management 
• Improved skills of other staff 
• Obtained external expertise 
• Increased capital expenditure 
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• Invested more in R & D 
• Launched new / improved product(s) / service(s) 
• Innovated in other ways 
• Improved quality of products / services 
• Reduced costs 
• Improved efficiency in other ways 
Individually and collectively, the changes and effects reported are indicative of 
increased small company competitiveness. 
CHAPTERS: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
1. The Venture Capital Schemes (VCS), in theory, appears to be a viable option in 
creating a competitive small firms economy. 
2. The respondent, Business Partners Limited - East Fund (representing the larger 
venture capital / private equity firms) have indicated that they will not be willing 
to become a VCT manager and drive the VCS framework, since it requires an 
adjustment to their investment philosophy. It could also be for the undisclosed 
reasons mentioned in section 4.3.3. 
3. The respondent has indicated that a RFI with a reasonable network of resources, 
operating as a private company, will be in the best position to drive the VCS 
framework. It will also be able to attract competition from the smaller venture 
capital / private equity firms, accounting firms and business advisors, to create a 
vibrant VCT market (industry). 
4. The two other key players in the VCT framework, namely investors and high~ 
growth firms (whose financial requirements lie in a unique equity gap) are 
available in South Africa. 
5. Hence, the introduction of the VCS framework to South Africa is probably a 
viable option (as per exploratory study), which needs to be studied further. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
1. In this study, it was asswned that the Administrator of the VCS, namely, The 
South African Revenue Services (SARS), would go along with the policy 
strategy and adopt the scheme. In a more comprehensive study, cwnulative cost 
of the VCS to the public purse, in terms of tax foregone (excluding possible 
gains from an increased SME economy), should be investigated and estimated, 
to give an indication of the optimal size of the VCT market that will meet the 
requirements to create a competitive SME economy. 
2. In a more comprehensive study, the resources and ability of a RFI to launch and 
implement the VCS, should also be evaluated. 
3. In a more comprehensive study (both quantitative and qualitative), the smaller 
venture capital / private equity firms, accounting firms and business advisors, 
should be assessed, to what extent they will be able to register and become 
successful VCT managers, to create a vibrant VCT market (industry). 
4. The operating costs, financing costs and gross profit margins of a potential VCT 
manager should also be evaluated and compared to the UK VCT fund managers. 
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Summary of the Venture Capital Schemes 
Overview 
This section of the literature review presents a brief outline of the four schemes and 
the participants of each scheme, together with the rules and regulations of the 
schemes. The contents of the review are as follows: 
1. Introduction 
2. History of the Schemes 
3. Administration of the VCS Framework 
4. Rationale for the Schemes 
5. Objectives of the Schemes 
6. The VCT scheme 
7. The Corporate Venturing Scheme 
8. The Enterprise Investment Scheme 
9. Development of the VCT market 
10. The VCT investment remit 
11. Performance of the VCT funds 
[The information contained in this Appendix is compiled, using the 
sources listed below: 
• www.ir.gov.uklrnanuals 
• Allenbridge Group plc - Tax Shelter Report, 
www.taxshelter.systernaticrnarketing.com 
• ISIS report - Your guide to investing in Venture Capital Trusts, 
www.isisinvestor.com 




The Venture Capital Schemes consist of the following individual schemes: 
• Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) 
• Venture Capital Trust scheme (VCT) 
• Corporate Venturing Scheme (CVS) 
• Relief for capital losses (VC loss reliet) 
These schemes can be grouped together because they have similar aims and have 
certain legislative features in common. 
The central aim of the venture capital schemes is to encourage investment in 
small unquoted trading companies. Small businesses generally, while often able to 
obtain modest loans or overdraft facilities, can find larger amounts of capital 
difficult to raise. The exact range of this 'equity gap', as it is known, is open to 
dispute, but the existence of a funding gap of some kind is commonly agreed. 
The EIS aims to attract investment from individuals (and, in the case of deferral relief 
under the scheme, from certain trustees), while the CVS aims to promote investment 
by companies and thereby to encourage corporate venturing relationships. The VCT 
scheme encourages indirect investment by individuals, through the medium of a 
corporate vehicle similar to an investment trust. 
2. History of the Scheme 
The first initiative to be taken with a view to encouraging investment in small private 
trading companies was a facility for capital losses on unquoted shares of such 
companies to be relieved against income tax. This was introduced in 1980. It 
remained substantially unchanged until 1998, when it was aligned with the provisions 
of the EIS. It is referred to in this manual as 'VC loss relief. 
In 1981 a scheme called the Business Start-Up Scheme (or Relief for Investment in 
New Corporate Trades) was introduced. It was superseded in 1983 by the Business 
Expansion Scheme (BES), which provided relief for investment in both new and 
existing trading companies. In 1986 BES was extended to give exemption from 
Capital Gains Tax in cases where BES reliefhad been given. 
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BES came to an end at the end of 1993, when it was replaced by EIS. This 
represented a revision and fine-tuning ofBES, and added to the income tax relief 
on subscriptions and COT exemption the facility of a COT deferral relief, which 
was available for chargeable gains reinvested in shares attracting the income tax 
relief In 1998, when there was a major revision of EIS, this deferral relief 
became available whether or not income tax reliefhad been obtained on the new 
shares. In this way it effectively replaced a set of CGT provisions known as 
Reinvestment Relief , which was then abolished. 
In 1995 the Venture Capital Trust scheme was introduced. This provided a range of 
reliefs for an individual investing in a Venture Capital Trust, which is a company 
investing its funds mainly in small unquoted trading companies. 
Finally, in 2000, reliefs somewhat similar to those provided under the EIS were made 
available to companies through the Corporate Venturing Scheme, which was 
introduced for a ten-year period as part of an initiative to promote corporate venturing 
activity. 
3. Administration of ves Framework 
The Venture Capital Schemes (VCS) Framework consists of the VCT, CVS, EIS, and 
VC loss relief schemes. The framework is administrated by Inland Revenue's Savings 
and Pensions Schemes (SPS). For the purpose of this thesis, only the VCT and CVS 
will be covered in detail, the EIS and VC loss relief, will only be referred to, since 
they are incorporated to a certain extent within the VCT and CVS schemes. The 
guideline rules and policies, are formulated by the Board ofInland Revenue. 
Qualification and acceptance by the different parties of each scheme is subject to the 
approval of the SPS. 
The VCT consist of the following parties, each subjected to its own set of rules: 
• VCT company, 
• Qualifying holdings, and 
• Investors 
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The CVS consist of the investor company (corporate) and investee company 
(qualifying holding). 
The EIS scheme is an intermediate between the VCT and CVS. Its investors, 
(normally in the form of 'business angels') would prefer to invest directly into a 
qualifying holding, and avoid paying management fees to a VCT company. 
4. Rationale for the Schemes 
The rationale for the schemes is that smaller, unquoted companies find it difficult to 
raise external equity finance for one or more of the following reasons: 
2. Information costs. 
The costs to an investor of obtaining the information needed to appraise the 
risks and expected returns from an investment tend to be high, relative to the 
size of investment, in the case of smaller companies. 
2. Asymmetric Information and principal! agent problems. 
A business owner is likely to be better placed than prospective external 
venture capitalists to assess the prospects for hislher business. The latter might 
wish to compensate for this by seeking higher returns and exercising a degree 
of control over how the business is run. However, entrepreneurs may be 
reluctant to dilute their control by bringing in external equity. As a result, 
profitable investment and growth opportunities may be forgone. 
3. Inexperienced management. 
Entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers etc. who wish to exploit their ideas 
commercially may lack managerial skills, making external investors reluctant 
to put in funds. The EIS allows for the possibility of investors taking a 
managerial role in a company, following their investment. Similarly, a VCT's 
managers may have more influence than an individual investor could have 
over how a company receiving funds is run. 
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5. Objectives of the Schemes 
Both the VCT and EIS schemes have similar broad objectives: 
1. The immediate objective ofthe schemes is that the tax incentives provided 
by the EIS and the VCT scheme should improve the post-tax returns for 
investors, thereby encouraging them to invest more in the companies 
covered by the schemes (i.e. the schemes should increase the supply of 
finance). 
2. The intermediate objective ofthe schemes is that the companies should 
then be enabled to use the funds to improve their performance. 
3. The ultimate objective is that the UK economy should benefit by having a 
more competitive small firms economy. 
6. The VCT scheme 
The Venture Capital Trust (VCT) scheme was introduced in April 1995 after 
substantial public consultation. The VCT scheme is designed to encourage individuals 
to invest indirectly in unquoted small higher risk trading companies through VCTs. 
VCTs have the advantage of a managed fund, where the selection and monitoring of 
investments, are undertaken by a professional fund manager. A portfolio of 
investments enables some reduction in risk. VCTs are listed on the Stock Exchange 
and provide such trading companies with funds enabling them to develop and grow. 
VCT companies 
Broadly similar to investment trusts, they are investment companies quoted on the 
Stock Exchange. 
To qualify as a VCT a company must meet the following conditions: 
• At least 70% of its investments must be in qualifying shares or securities 
(including loans of at least 5 years) within 3 years; 
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• At least 30% ofthe value of its qualifying holdings must be in ordinary shares 
within 3 years and at least 10% of its holding in each company must be in such 
shares; 
• Its income must be wholly or mainly from shares or securities; 
• No holding in anyone company may represent more than 15% of its total 
investments; 
• Its ordinary share capital must be quoted on the London Stock Exchange; and 
• It must not retain more than 15% of the income that it derives from shares or 
securities. 
• Ifa VeT makes a further issue of shares, 70% of those funds must be invested 
in qualifying companies within 3 years ofthe date of the new fund raising. 
Qualifying holdings 
• Qualifying holdings are classified as newly issued shares or securities of an 
unquoted company, which exists wholly or mainly for the purpose of carrying 
on a qualifying trade in the UK. Exclusions include such trades as property, 
financial services and commodities. 
• The gross assets of the investee company must not exceed £ 15 million prior to 
the VeT's investment and £16 million post investment. 
• The maximum a VeT can invest in anyone company in any tax year is limited 
to £ 1 million. Investments in the same company in two different tax years 
must be at least six months apart. 
Investors (VeT relief) 
• Subscribers for new ordinary shares in veTs are entitled to claim income tax 
relief at 20 per cent on subscriptions up to £1 00,000 provided the shares are 
held for at least 3 years (5 years for shares issued prior to 6th April 2000). No 
income tax is payable on dividends from ordinary shares in veTs. 
, 
• Subscribers for new ordinary shares in veTs on which they have obtained 
income tax relief are also able to defer a capital gain, up to £100,000 a year. 
• No capital gains tax is payable on disposals by individuals of ordinary shares 
in VeTs. 
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Excluded Trades in VeT and EIS 
Trades will not currently qualify if excluded activities together amount to a substantial 
part of the trade. The main excluded activities are 
* 
• dealing in land, in commodities or futures or in shares, securities or other 
financial instruments 
• financial activities such as banking, money-lending, insurance, debt-
factoring, and hire-purchase financing 
• dealing in goods other than in an ordinary trade of retail or wholesale 
distribution 
• leasing or letting assets on hire, except in the case of certain ship-
chartering activities 
• oil extraction activities, except where for oil exploration leading to oil 
extraction 
• receiving royalties or licence fees, other than, in certain cases, such 
payments arising from film production, or from research and development 
• providing legal or accountancy services 
• property development * (also excluded for first six months of EIS) 
• farming or market gardening * 
• holding, managing, or occupying woodlands, any other forestry activities 




operating or managing hotels, guest houses or hostels * 
operating or managing nursing homes or residential care homes *, and 
providing services to another company where the other company's trade is 
substantially excluded activities. 
Activities excluded since March 1998. Whether excluded activities amount to a substantial part 
of a company's trade is decided by reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of a 
particular case, generally they will be substantial if they amount to more than 20 per cent of the 
trade. 
Initially, until November 1994, EIS scheme companies with more than half their assets in land 
or buildings were ineligible. 
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Investors for which VeTs are suitable 
YCT are suitable for particular types of investors including: 
• Those with maturing share options; 
• High earners who wish to reclaim 20% income tax; 
• Those seeking a growing, high, tax-free income; 
• Investors looking to defer capital gains, as a result of the sale of the privately 
owned business or demutualisation windfall; 
• Those who wish to rebalance a portfolio ripe with capital gains; 
• Those who have capital gains crystallising 12 months before or after potential 
potential subscription and who wish to defer their liability; and 
• Those looking at inheritance and estate planning, as there is no income or 
capital gains tax claw back on death. 
What should investors look for in a good veT fund manager 
The secret to private equity investment is understanding the key fundamentals that 
characterise a successful company. Before a good fund management team invests in 
any company, they get under the skin of the business. That means attending company 






Track record: How long have they been managing their private equity 
portfolio? If they are launching a YCT, is it their first one? 
Choice of trusts: Do they offer a range of fund types? For example, is a 
generalist, AiM or technology based portfolio more suitable to you, given your 
existing portfolio and attitude to risk? 
Size and experience of management team: 
Do they have a dedicated private equity team and do they have the necessary 
specialist back up e.g. researchers, business analysts and legal support? 
The number of VCTs: The more the number, the more likely they can invest 
in larger deals and offer a good spread of investment. 
• The management company's track record and deal flow: How are their 
existing private equity funds performing? 
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• Deal flow: Are they currently investing at the rate needed to meet all the 
qualifying rules for a VCT? 
• The costs involved: What are the running costs? Remember to assess the 
possible cost of any performance fees as well as issue costs and annual 
management fees. 
• Shareholder friendly policies: Does the fund have a buy-back policy in case 
you need to sell? 
• Investor relations: How often will you receive an update on the progress of 
your investment and how will your questions be dealt with? 
7. The Corporate Venturing Scheme (CVS) 
The Corporate Venturing Scheme ('CVS' ) provides a range of tax reliefs for 
companies, which subscribe for shares in other companies, known as qualifying 
issuing companies. The latter are companies, which are unquoted at the time the 
shares are issued and which carry on or are preparing to carry on certain types of 
trading activities, and satisfy certain requirements. Many of the conditions, which 
they have to meet, are identical with the conditions to be met under the Enterprise 
Investment Scheme (,EIS '), and there are a number of cross-references to the 
guidance. 
8. The Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) 
The Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) was introduced in 1994 to encourage 
individuals to invest in small higher-risk trading companies as a means to help 
alleviate the problems faced by such companies in raising equity finance. The scheme 
provides income tax relief for new equity investment by external investors and 
business angels in qualifying unquoted companies, and capital gains tax exemption on 
disposal of shares. In April 1998 capital gains tax reinvestment relief was merged 
with EIS to create a new unified scheme so that individuals and some trustees can 




• EIS companies must be unquoted at the time the shares are issued to investors. 
Throughout a period of at least three years, the company must exist for the 
purpose of a qualifying trade and must not be under the control of any other 
company. The money raised by the issue of shares must be employed in a 
qualifying business activity within certain time limits. 
• Qualifying business activities comprise not only trades but also research and 
development, which is intended to lead to a qualifying trade. Some trading 
activities are excluded. These include dealing in land or shares; money-
lending, insurance and other financial activities; dealing in goods, other than 
ordinary wholesale and retail trades; leasing or letting assets on hire, except 
certain ship-chartering activities; and receiving royalties or licence fees, other 
than those attributable, broadly, to intangible assets created by the company. 
From March 1998 certain property-backed activities were excluded. These are 
farming and market gardening, forestry, property development and operating 
or managing hotels, guesthouses, nursing or residential care homes. 
• Participation is limited to companies with gross assets of no more than £ 15 
million immediately before raising funds under the scheme and no more than 
£ 16 million immediately afterwards. 
EIS Reliefs 
• Investors can obtain income tax relief at 20 per cent on investments up to 
£150,000 in any tax year. The upper limit for relief was increased from 
£1 00,000 a year to this in 1998-99. There is no limit on the investment 
qualifying for deferral of liability to capital gains tax. 
• The reliefs are available only for investment in new ordinary shares in 
qualifying companies. Investors must hold their shares for at least 3 years (5 
years for shares issued prior to 6th April 2000) to retain their income tax relief 
in full, unless the company is wound up for genuine commercial reasons. 
• A gain arising from the disposal of shares for which EIS income tax relief was 
obtained and retained is exempt from capital gains tax (CGT). 
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Business Angels 
The term "business angel" is used here to describe an investor who becomes a paid 
director on or after the date of buying shares in a company. To qualify for income tax 
relief, such an investor must not previously have been connected with the company or 
involved in its trade, and must not own more than 30 per cent of the company's 
shares. 
9. Development of the VCT market 
Since 1995 when the first VCT was launched, around 60 have come to the market and 
have raised almost £1.4 billion between them. And, over the past three tax years (to 
5.4.01) the amount of funds raised each year has almost tripled. 
(source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Allenbridge 31.7.01). 
Investment at an early stage in young, high-growth companies is where real returns 
can be seen. Normally, access to such companies is restricted to venture capitalists, or 
wealthy individuals known as 'business angels', who invest directly in an 
entrepreneur's business or through a scheme such as an EIS. These people supply 
young companies with cash to start them off on the route to a stock market quotation. 
VCTs are one of the best ways for you, as a private investor, to access this part ofthe 
market while at the same time reducing the risks of investment. They allow you to 
benefit from the skills of professional managers, to invest in a portfolio of stocks 
rather than gambling on one or two, plus give you an enhanced return through the 
generous tax breaks on offer. From slow beginnings, the popularity ofVCTs as a 
more mainstream investment is increasing. Many VCT launches are over subscribed 
because of the surge of investors becoming aware of their attractions. 
10. The VCT investment remit 
VCTs can invest in both unquoted and AiM companies. Trusts tend to fall into one of 
three focus areas; generalist, AiM or technology. There are advantages to each, but a 
balanced portfolio would cover all three. 
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(a) Generalist 
Generalist funds concentrate mainly on investment in unquoted companies and are 
akin to the wider venture capital industry. 
The UK venture capital industry has shown sizeable growth in recent years. The 
amount invested in 1995 in the UK grew from £2.1 billion to £6.4 billion in the year 
to 31.12.00 
(source: British Venture Capital Association (BVCA)lPricewaterhouseCoopers). 
Over ten years to 31.12.00, the net annual investment return for the BVCA 
membership (about 95% of all investors) averaged 20.4%. This compares to the FTSE 
All-Share Index returns of 15.4% a year over the same period and 13.6% a year 
achieved by mixed pension funds (source: WM company). 
In the year to 30.9.00, the number ofunquoted transactions backed by VCTs was 
estimated to be 150 (source: PricewaterhouseCoopers) and represented about one in eight of 
all venture capital backed deals in the UK by number. These transactions enable VCT 
investors to build up a selected portfolio within the VCT offaster growth companies. 
This would be very difficult otherwise, especially as the typical venture capitalist will 
only wish to back three in every 100 opportunities. 
Unquoted companies are usually valued following the BVCA valuation guidelines as 
there is no ready ability to sell unquoted company shareholdings. This typically 
results in cautious valuations in the early years of an unquoted portfolio until the 
shareholdings are either sold to a trade buyer or floated on a recognised stock 
exchange. This can result in a ' J-curve' growth in net asset value per share which is 
flat at first, followed by an upward swing. 
(b) Alternative Investment Market (AiM) 
AiM is a natural home for VCT monies as it is host to a wide range of dynamic 
growth companies, many of which fit the rules for VCT investing. There are few 
VCTs which concentrate solely on AiM, however. Being a regulated market, AiM 
imposes disciplines on its member companies and allows for a greater degree of 
liquidity and transparency than many unquoted investments which constitute the 
majority of holdings within conventional VCTs. In fact, AiM stocks are sometimes 
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tagged as venture capital with a quote. With AiM companies there is also a greater 
potential to sell a holding, though it can be an illiquid market. 
The AiM market was launched by the London Stock Exchange in June 1995 with the 
objective of providing young and growing companies with the means of accessing 
equity capital to facilitate their expansion. From the initial ten quoted companies, it 
has shown itself to be a very important source of capital to growing small British 
companies, now comprising 587 companies with a market capitalisation of £12.4 
billion (at 31 ,7.01). £6.9 billion has been raised by the companies on AiM, since 
launch and they are using this capital to finance their development and growth plans. 
Private investors usually find it difficult to subscribe for these fund raisings as they 
are normally done by way of institutional placings rather than public offers. 
83 companies, which started on AiM, capitalised at £8.4 billion, have now progressed 
to the Official List (at 31.8.01) and around 121 Companies have joined AiM so far in 
2001. (Figures sourced from London Stock Exchange 14.9.01.) 
AiM comprises a diversity of businesses by sector and size of company but 
investment typically gives you significant exposure to technology and technology-
enabled businesses including biotech, healthcare, computer software and quoted 
internet companies. 
AiM listed companies are particularly attractive because they are young and 
entrepreneurial with plans for growth and a requirement for capital to develop. This 
makes AiM an exciting market for the growth investor. Around 30 to 35% of the 
companies are typically owned by their directors, meaning the directors have a vested 
interest in creating capital value for the business. 
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Table 1-1 









Source: London Stock Exchange 31.07.01 
(c) Technology 
Technology-focused funds are at the more risky end ofVCT investment. They do 
have the potential for very high returns, but this should be balanced with the volatility 
inherent in the market. If you are after technology exposure, it may, however, be 
wiser to invest in a spread of investments such as that available with a VCT rather 
than selecting a single stock or two. 
11. Performance of VeT funds 
Performance ofVCT funds has varied depending on the sectors they have chosen to 
invest in. Also, when looking at the performance of a VCT, you need to remember 
that it will take a couple of years for the managers to fully invest the funds and for 
true performance to show through. Performance tends to be flat at first, as most 
investment is in fixed-interest securities and some investments may fail. It is then 
usually characterised by an upward swing as investments start to mature (the 'J-
curve'). Significant trading in the shares is not likely to start until after the three year 
lock-in is over. 
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11.1 Performance ofUK private equity funds (excluding) VCTs 
The table below highlights the impressive performance ofUK private equity funds. 
The superior performance story explains why the UK private equity industry 
continues to attract record levels of funds from both foreign and UK institutional 
investors. UK pension funds alone committed £1.6 billion to private equity in 2001 , 
almost twice as much as in the previous year. 
Table /-2 
Overall performance by investment stage 
Number 5-years 10-years 
Of funds (% pa) (% pa) 
Early stage 58 10.8 11.3 
Development 53 11.2 15.6 
MidMBO 61 10.2 l3.9 
Large MBO 53 16.0 18.4 
Generalist 50 24.2 20.0 
Total I average 275 15.7 17.4 
FTSE All Share 7.3 11.6 
FT IS&P World (ex UK) 9.6 11.0 
FT IS&P Europe (ex UK) 10.8 l3.4 
Source: British Venture Capital Association. Figures are to 31.12.01. The table above highlights the 
performance of ' independent' UK private equity funds - funds raised from external investors for 
investment at the venture capital (early stage and development) and private equity (MBO) stages, but 
excluding development capital investment trusts (VCITs) and venture capital trusts (VCTs). 
8.1 Performance of UK VCTs 
The following tables ofVCT performance are taken from the Allenbridge Group plc-
Tax Shelter Report (as at 27 March 2003). The following disclosures are to be noted :-
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1. Table oflnternal Rates of Return (lRR) for current VCTs based on latest published Net 
Asset Values (NA V). Figures only relate to investors who purchased the first issue of 
shares. 
2. We are publishing these tables as a contribution from an independent source to the debate 
on how VCT fund managers have performed. To this end we compare the amount 
invested in a share against the distribution stream plus the latest net asset value. 
Dividends up to the end of the 1999/00 tax year are gross. As we are measuring fund 
manager performance the tax breaks are not relevant. However, because of the issues 
mentioned in the note following the table, we do not believe that conclusions can yet be 
drawn from the data to judge the performance of fund managers. 
3. Allenbridge believe that the only way to compare funds properly is to incorporate the 
time value of money through a discounting technique such as the Internal Rate of Return. 
Adding dividends paid to Net Asset Value does not do the job. 
4. There is only a limited value in this table as you cannot compare AIM funds with general 
funds nor can a new fund be compared to one that has been running a few years. In 
general, any fund that holds AIM stocks will look good . compared to one whose 
unquoted holdings are valued conservatively according to British Venture Capital 
Association guidelines. 
5. As Allenbridge repeat frequently in Tax Shelter Report, the share price is no indicator of 
value as there is virtually no market for second hand VCT shares- purchasers do not 
receive full tax reliefs and sellers lose their tax reliefs if they seU within the first five 
years. 
6. There are many timing and investment valuation issues which inhibit direct comparison 
of rates of return between VCTs: AIM stocks can be valued at mid-market or at a 
discount to reflect illiquidity; unquoted investments are valued according to guidelines 
that are open to interpretation; most VCTs have immature portfolios; VCTs have net asset 
values declared on different dates. 
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Table /-3 
GENERALlST FUNDS STARTED IN TAX YEARS 95/96 AND 96/97 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Return Trading last Return 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net day published 
Internal 




Close Brothers VCT Plc C Shares 15.50 106.80 100 140.40 17/03198 30109/02 8.8 
Close Brothers VCT Plc Ord 24.20 106.80 100 151 ,90 04/04/96 30109/02 7.7 
Ch"rCV" 
Oxford Tech. VCT plc 4.90 119.00 100 120.40 04/04/97 31108102 3.5 
Enterprise VCT plc A shares 6.50 87.90 100 120,60 13/01/97 31/12102 3.4 
Baronsmead VCT plc 10.80 86.90 100 121 .20 13111/95 31/12102 3.1 
Northern Venture Trust plc 43.30 80.10 100 106.90 01/11/95 30109/02 1.1 
Quester VCT plc 32.10 63.60 100 105.10 04/04/96 31112102 0.9 
Close Brothers Protected Plc 27.90 79.00 100 96.30 04/04/97 28102103 (0.7) 
Elderstreet Millenium VCT 19.10 68.00 100 91 .50 04/04/96 31108102 (1 .5) 
Murray VCT plc 26.60 55.60 100 84.10 28109/95 31108108 (2.8) 
British Small Cos VCT plc 16.20 64.30 100 82,70 04/04/96 31112102 (3.1) 
Murray VCT2 plc 37.20 60.70 100 83.00 08104/97 31/08102 (3.8) 
AdventVCT 31 .50 56.60 100 63.80 04/04/96 28102103 (6.8) 
Guinness Flight VCT plc 32.90 75.50 100 76.70 05104/96 31/08102 (4.1) (1 ) 
Source: Allenhndge Tax Shelter Report 
Table /-4 
GENERALlST FUNDS STARTED IN TAX YEARS 97/98 AND 98/99 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of last Total 
Raised Asset Price Return trading day published Return 
(£m) 
Value 
(pence) (Net Asset NAVfigure Internal 
(pence) 
Value plus Rate of 
dividends) Return 
(pence) (%) 
Foresight Tech. 10.90 97.90 100 200.90 17/11/97 30/09102 22.2 
VCTplc 
Baronsmead 2 45.20 95.20 100 108.40 02104/98 31112102 1.8 
VCTplc 
Downing Protected 9.80 79.50 100 101 .20 19/05/97 30/06102 0.3 
Healthcare VCT 
Close Brothers 14.60 80.30 100 95.00 26101199 31/12102 (1 .4) 
Development Plc 
Murray VCT3 plc 40.00 n.10 100 93.80 08104/98 31/08102 (1.6) 
Elderstreet Downing 15.10 59.90 100 
VCTplc 
84.40 21/05/98 31/12102 (4.1) 
Quester VCT 2 plc 45.80 57.50 100 84.10 17/03198 31/01/03 (4.1) 
Advent2VCT 35.00 53.70 100 73.70 16103198 31/12102 (7.1) 
Source. Allenhndge Tax Shelter Report 
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Table 1-5 
AIM BASED STARTED IN TAX YEARS 95/96 AND 96/97 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Return trading last Return 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net Asset day published Internal 
(pence) Value plus NAV Rate of 
dividends) figure Return 
(pence) (%) 
Pennine AIM 4.60 99.20 100 154.30 04/04/96 31112102 7.8 
VCTplc 
Capital for Companies 10.40 72.70 100 102.70 15/04/96 31/12102 0.5 
VCTplc 
Legg Mason AIM 17.60 48.70 100 95.60 03105/96 31/01/03 (0,9) 
Distribution Trust plc 
Source: AlIenbndge Tax Shelter Report 
Table 1-6 
AIM BASED STARTED IN TAX YEARS 97/98 AND 98/99 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of last Total 
Raised Asset Price Return trading day published Return 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net Asset NAVfigure Internal 




Close Brothers AIM 10.10 59.00 100 111 .30 30/04/98 31/01/03 3.0 
VCTplc 
Pennine AIM 4.60 69.00 100 105.50 01/05/97 31/12102 1.1 
VCT" plc 
Pennine Downing AIM 10.20 69.00 100 76.50 21/05198 31/01/03 (5.8) 
VCTplc 
BWD Airn VCT plc 23.50 63.80 100 71 .30 25/06/98 28102103 (7.2) 
AIMVCTplc 17.00 48.20 100 69.10 09/12198 24/03/03 (9.6) 
Singer & Friedlander 16.50 29.30 100 61 .70 24/11/98 27/02103 (14.7) 
AIMVCTplc 
Source: Allenbndge Tax Shelter Report 
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Table 1-7 
GENERALlST AND HYBRID LAUNCHED IN TAX YEAR 99/00 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Asset Issue Total First trading Date of last Total 
Raised Value Price Retum day published Retum 
(£m) (pence) (pence) (Net Asset NAVfigure Internal 
Value plus Rate of 
dividends) Retum 
(pence) (%) 
Northem 2 VCT plc 24.30 94,50 100 102.70 21/04/99 31/01/03 0.7 
Foresight Tech. VCT 0.90 73.70 100 80.00 02111199 30/09/02 (7.5) 
plcC Shares 
TnVen VCT plc 19,10 67.60 100 72,90 06104/99 31/10102 (8.7) 
Talisman 5.30 12.70 19 12.70 04/04/00 30109/02 (9.2) 
British Smaller Tech. 14.00 63.30 100 64.20 06/04/99 30109/02 (12,0) 
Cos. VCTplc 
Downing Classic VCT 6.70 57.70 100 59.90 13105199 31/10/02 (13.8) 
plc 
Quester VCT 3 plc 48.00 56.00 100 57.80 16/02100 31/01/03 (17.2) 
Source: Allenbndge Tax Shelter Report 
Table 1-8 
GENERALlST AND HYBRID LAUNCHED IN TAX YEARS 00/01'Z) 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Retum trading day last Retum 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net Asset published Internal 
(pence) Value plus NAVfigure Rate of 
dividends) Retum 
(pence) (%) 
Oxford Tech 2 VCT plc 6.00 140.00 100 142.00 05/04/00 31/08102 
Baronsmead 3 VCT 33.00 94.90 100 100.00 30101/01 31/12102 
Murray VCT 4 plc 38.30 88.20 100 94.50 11/04/00 31/08102 
ProVen 22.00 79.10 100 84.97 10/04/00 31/08/02 
Sitka 7.60 88.60 100 89.60 26/03/01 30/10102 
Quester VCT 4 plc 53.00 78.50 100 8.40 10/11/00 31/01/03 
Trivest 41 .70 76.20 100 79.20 15/11/00 31/12102 
Close Technology and 13.20 73.00 100 77.00 17/01/01 28/02103 
General 
Matrix e-Ventures 13.10 69.30 100 71 ,60 11/07/00 31/10102 
DONning Classic 3 VCT 21 .90 '74.90 100 77.90 04/04/01 31110/02 
DONning Classic 2 VCT 11 .00 57.70 100 59.80 10/04100 31/10102 
plc 
Pennine DONning 10.70 52.10 100 53.40 10/04100 30/09/02 
Ethical 
i-Net VCT plc 10.70 52.30 100 53.80 18107/00 31/10102 
e-Technology 13.60 66.20 100 66.20 30/06100 30109/01 
Source. Allenbndge Tax Shelter Report 
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Table I-9 
AIM BASED LAUNCHED IN TAX YEARS 00/01(2) 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Return trading day last 
Return 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net Asset published 
Internal 




AIMVCT2plc 41 .80 75.20 100 77.40 04/12100 24103/03 
Close Brothers AIM 16.00 71 .00 100 74.30 11/08100 31101/03 
VCT C shares plc 
Singer & Friedlander 33.00 74.00 100 75.70 30/01101 20103/03 
AIM 3VCT plc 
Arternis AIM 33.00 78.40 100 79.30 20102101 31/07102 
Singer & Friedlander 22.00 52.10 100 54.00 04/04/00 20103/03 
AIM2VCTplc 
Northern AIM 22.00 53.70 100 54.40 11/01/01 28102103 
Source: Allenbridge Tax Shelter Report 
Table I-10 
GENERALlST FUNDS LAUNCHED IN TAX YEARS 01/02 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Return trading day last Return 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net Asset published Internal 




Aberdeen GrO'Nth 24.40 60.90 100 62.00 10/04/01 31/01/03 
Aberdeen GrO'Nth 10.00 93.20 100 93.20 12112101 30111/02 
Opportunities 
Baronsmead 4 18.40 94.10 100 95.10 20/12102 30/11/03 
BioScience 7.00 93.70 100 94.50 19/04102 31/12102 
British Smaller Tech. 6.80 92.50 100 92.50 10/04/01 30106102 
Companies 2 
Electra Klngsway 15.40 93.30 100 94.10 25/01/02 30109/02 
Leisure and Media 8.90 93.50 100 94.30 08106101 31112102 
Northern 3 13.90 95.50 100 96.10 17/12101 31/12102 
Oxford Technology 3 4.00 96.00 100 96.00 04/04102 31108102 
Quester VCT 5 18.40 92.60 100 92.60 24/12101 31/01/03 
ProVen Media 5.60 90.40 100 92.80 31/05/01 31/08102 
Source. Allenbndge Tax Shelter Report 
77 
Table 1-11 
AIM BASED FUNDS LAUNCHED IN TAX YEARS 01/02 
Venture Capital Trust Funds Net Issue Total First Date of Total 
Raised Asset Price Retum trading day last Retum 
(£m) Value (pence) (Net published Internal 
(pence) Asset NAVfigure Rate of 
Value plus Retum 
dividends) (%) 
(pence) 
LeggMason In\leStors 8.90 45.70 100 47.30 30/04/01 31/01/03 
Pennine Downing AIM 2 12.50 67.00 100 68.00 31/05/01 31/01/03 
Teather & Greenwood 2.75 96.80 100 96.80 27103/02 31/12102 
AIM 
Unicorn AIM 35.00 83.10 100 83.60 05111/01 28102103 
Source: Allenbridge Tax Shelter Report 
(\) no recent NAV 
(2) Internal rates of return on these recent VeTs are not shown as they convey little meaning 
VeTs are ranked alphabetically 
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Appendix 11 
South Africa's SMME Support Network 
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SMME Policy Framework in Post Apartheid South Africa 
1. Introduction 
The 1995 White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of 
Small Business in SA has been the first major effort by the South African government 
to design a policy framework particularly targeting the entire spectrum of small 
enterprise sector. 
The overall objective of the strategy was to create an enabling environment for 
SMME growth in the country as a way of addressing basic inequalities in the 
economy. The Act legalized the establishment of new institutions, an affirmative 
procurement reform, and the formation of an advisory board to review SMME' s legal 
regulatory environment. 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS TO FACILITATE SMME 
GROWTH 
In response to the challenges set out in the White Paper, a four-pronged new 
institutional network at national level were established to drive the National Small 
Business Strategy: 
• The Centre for Small Business Promotion (CSBP) of the DTI 
• National Small Business Council (NSBC) 
• Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency (Ntsika or NEP A) 
• Khula Enterprise Finance. 
3. Description Of South Africa's SMME Support Network 
3.1.1 Ntsika or NEPA 
Ntsika was initiated by the DTI to implement the national SMME strategy. It provides 
non-financial support to SMME's via a range of programmes that are accessible 
through a network of retail service provides classified as: 
• Local Business Service Centers: For assistance in business administration and 
general information. 
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• Tender Advice Centers: To provide assistance and training to SMME' s on 
government tendering processes and inform about current tenders. 
• Manufacturing Advice Centers: Provides industry specific assessments and 
link SMME's to highly specialized service providers. 
Technical colleges were founded for the purpose of implementing the Technopreneur 
Programme for potential SMME entrepreneur to improve their technical skills. 
3.2 Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd 
Khula has initiated, since its establishment in 1996,a number of loan schemes to 
increase access to finance for SMME' s through Retail Financial Intermediaries 
(RFIs), which are SMME departments of commercial banks or accredited NGOs. 
RFIs apply their own minimum lending criteria (the most basic is the provision of a 
business plan) as the responsibility of risk assessment lies entirely with the RFIs. 
The scheme can be grouped as follows: 
3.2.1 Business Loan Scheme: Out ofa total ofR400 million, loans to the value of 
RI million to RI00 million are forwarded to RFI's to capacitate them to 
increase their willingness to provide loans to SMME' s. 
3.2.2 Gaurantee Schemes: Guarantees are underwritten by Khula to reduce the risk 
oflending to SMMEs without sufficient collateral. 
3.2.3 Equity Funds: Through the internet-based Emerging Enterprise Zone (EEZ) as 
part of the lSE, SMMEs are expected to gain access to equity funding (up to 
R250 OOO,constituting less than 45% of the total equity and to re-capitalise 
within five years) from private investors with whom Khula might partner. 
Unclear business plans or problems to determine the willingness to repay have 
been two of the reasons for rejections, only a minority of SMMEs has access 
to the Internet. 
In addition, Khula Institutional Support Services Ltd offers seed loans to 
organizations that aim to become RFIs.Khula also runs a capacity building 
programme for existing and potential RFI Staff. 
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3.3 DTI and its institutions. 
A number ofDTI Incentive Schemes were designed exclusively for (registered) 
SMME industrialists and include: 
• Standard Leased Factory Building Scheme, of the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), which makes general purpose factory buildings 
available for lease to SMMEs 
• SmallfMedium Manufacturing Development Programme (SMEDP), which 
consists of tax-exempt establishment grant as a percentage of the 
investment for the first two years and a Skills Support Programme (SSP) if 
the business has an approved training programme. 
D Economic Empowerment Scheme, for the expansion or 
establishment project ofPDI SMME entrepreneurs to which the IDC 
contributes the majority of capital outlay. 
D Venture Capital Schemes, with which the IDC co-finances viable 
product ventures. 
D Normal Finance Scheme, which provides for low-interest IDC 
administrated finance during expansion. 
D Import Finance Scheme, which consists of credit and guarantee 
facilities for importing capital goods and services. 
D Short-Term Export Finance guarantee Facility, through which the 
credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) can provide pre- and 
-post shipment export finance guarantee for SMMEs; and 
D Export Marketing and Investment Assistance Schemes (EMIA), 
which provides funding for primary market reseach, outward selling 
and inward buying trade missions and assistance to take part in 
exhibitions. 
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3.4 Provincial SMME Desks 
The provincial SMME Desks were established to ensure provincial representation of 
SMME interest as well as contribute to implementation of national strategy. Their 
main task is to link national or sectoral programmes with local or regional 
implementation bodies and establish a comprehensive SMME database on which 
national policy changes can be based. 
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Appendix III 
Factors in the growth of micro-enterprises: Developing a framework 
and exploring the implications 
by Lew Perren, 1996, PhD Thesis - University of Brighton 
(The summary of this review has been adapted from the 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 
Volume 6, Number 4 and Volume 7, Number 1) 
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Factors in the growth of micro-enterprises: Developing a framework and exploring 
the implications 
The research examines the micro-enterprises pursuing gradual growth. The research 
findings develop an empirically verified framework (Figure 1) that explains how 
growth is influenced by a myriad of interacting factors. This leads to a discussion of 
the policy implications of the framework and explores the managerial implications of 
the framework. Also the research can be applied to small firms to pursue gradual 
growth. 
MANAGERIAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
• Four interim growth drivers influence micro-enterprise development: owner' s 
growth motivation, expertise in managing growth, resource access and 
demand. 
• The interim growth drivers are in turn influenced by a myriad of independent 
factors. 
• Growth beyond the micro-enterprise phase requires the combined influence of 
the independent factors to be positive on all four interim growth drivers. 
• There is the possibility of compensation, the phenomenon where, a deficit in 
one factor's influence against an interim growth driver can be counterbalanced 
by another. 
• The framework provides micro-enterprise owner-managers and their advisers 
with a checklist of potential compensating factors for each of the interim 
growth drivers. This should provide an agenda for stimulating growth beyond 
the micro-enterprise phase. 
• Micro-enterprise development has been shown to be a process of slow 
incremental iterative adaptation to emerging situations, rather than a sequence 
of radical clear steps or decision points. 
• Micro-enterprises need timely and tailored support, rather than any form of 
standard supply-side policies, which will be wasteful and not address real 
needs. What is needed is support that is owner-manager centred, rather than 
adviser-centred. 
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• The diagnostic toolkit provides micro-enterprise owner-managers and their 
advisers with a systematic way of exploring the influences on the interim 
growth drivers and highlighting ways of compensating deficits in particular 
factors. 
• Adopting a Socratic questioning approach helps unleash owner-managers' 
intimate knowledge about their businesses and empowers them to think 
creatively about growth opportunities. 
• Owner-manager centred approaches like this should be encouraged, as they 
can help develop diagnostic skills and self-awareness. They may also reduce 
the risk of over dependence on external advisers. 
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Figure 111-1: Diagrammatic summary of the empirically verified framework 
~I Planning r-... 
Personality Attributes 
Fl. Desire to 'be ones own boss 
---. F2. Desire to succeed ~ F7 GI 
FIO Owner's 
F3. Active risk taker F9 Growth 
FII Motivation 
F4. Innovator F8 
I Owner I 
,H ,h 
G2. 
~ Transferable Experiences -+ F2 Expertise 
FI in I Formalisation I F5. Transferable personal capital F9 Managing FI6 Growth 
F6. Transferable personal skills 
~~ 
F7. Transferable support skills 
F8. Transferable network of contacts 
" " " Growth of 
Micro- : Change to enterprise Organisation 
." .. .. ~ 
- Stakeholder Patrona~e 
~ F9. Family, 'investing' friends .. 
FIO. Key employees, partners FI2 G3 Delegation 
Fll. Active professional advisors F5 Resource 
F9 Access 
F12. Debtors and creditors 
FIO 
U F8 F14 
4 External Influences F14 G4 
FI5 -
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F3 




F16. Competitive Dynamics F9 
Independent Factors Interim Growth Drivers 
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Appendix IV 
National Competitive Advantage: Porter's Diamond 
Michael Porter, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1990, page 77 
(This summary is taken from International Business-Competing 
in the Global Marketplace, 3rd Edition, 2002, Charles W. Hill) 
88 
National Competitive Advantage: Porter 's Diamond 
Although this thesis was written with an international focus, it does however have 
implications for SMEs pursuing growth. Such SMEs need to place themselves in 
context of the big picture and see how they fit in, if they are to aim for the top of 
success ladder. Also, government is a major player in this theory. Furthermore, this 
theory is a reasonable starting point for Khula and TEO to assess potential high-
growth SMEs. 
The theory essentially examines why a nation achieves success international success 
in a particular industry. Porter's thesis is that four broad attributes of a nation shape 
the environment in which local firms compete, and the attributes promote or impede 
the creation of a competitive advantage. These four attributes are Factor endowments, 
Demand conditions, Related and supporting industries, and Firm strategy, structure, 
and domestic rivalry, which constitutes the diamond. 
Factor 
Endowments 









Porter maintains that two additional variables can influence the national diamond in 
important ways: chance and government. Chance events, such as major innovations, 
create discontinuities that can unfreeze or reshape industry structure and provide the 
opportunity for one nation' s firms to supplant another' s. Government, by its choice of 
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policies, can detract or improve national advantage. For example, regulation can alter 
home demand conditions, antitrust policies can influence the intensity of rivalry 
within an industry, and government investments in education can change factor 
endowments. 
Porter's argument is that the degree to which an industry (enterprise) will achieve 
success is a function of the combined impact of Factor endowments, Demand 




Secondary data analysis of SMEs 
This section attempts to provide some insights with regard to the following two 
Issues: 
• Are there high-growth SMEs that are being overlooked by suppliers of 
finance? 
• Is there an equity gap to service the needs of SMEs? 
It is discussed in-depth in the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) draft 
report "The Economics ofSMMEs in South Africa", February 2002, Cassim et aI, 
Pages 12-32, 72-83 and downloadable from the website www.tips.org.za. 
The following information, presented in brief, is intended to shed some light: 
1. Sectoral dynamics - sectors with high company creations 
2. Evidence of untapped potential in rural areas 
3. Angel finance and Venture Capital as sources ofSME finance 
4. SMMEs low level of investment as a symtom of a financing problem 
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1. Sectoral dynamics - sectors with high company creations 
Two additional sources, GEM (2001) and Stats SA 2000 are used to draw inferences 
on the sectoral dynamics - in the last five years and in 2000, which sectors witnessed 
the most enterprise creation? In which sectors does entrepreneurship appear to be 
sustainable? 
• Sectors with high company creations in the last 5-10 years 
According to both sources, two sectors emerge as having had a strong creation 
activity, namely the financial and business services and trade/hotels and 
restaurants. This is not surprising as these are known to be popular start-ups 
activities. In the former case, though, this dynamic creation activity seems to be 
compensated by a fairly high "attrition rate" ), almost 11 per cent of new 
registrations in 1999. 
The manufacturing sector is fairly dynamic, as GEM results suggest (high share 
among new firms in particular). Nevertheless, according to registration statistics, 
the sector's creation activity is rather ' average' relative to its size in the formal 
economy. What is more, the sector appears to have the highest attrition (11.3 per 
cent). 
• Sectors with high company creations in 2000 
Looking at most recent creations (in 2000), the above-mentioned three sectors 
remain significant. In addition, the sector of "social and personal services" 
emerges both from GEM results (very high share of start-ups but not of new firms) 
and from the Registrar's data as a sector where creations have accelerated in 2000. 
• Contradictory results 
For three sectors, the two sources apparently yield contrary results. Apart from 
possible measuring weaknesses, other explanations are also sought for this 
discrepancy. 
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Construction: The Registrar suggests that in the last 10 years, the construction 
sector has had the second-most vibrant registration activity, albeit with a slight 
slow-down in 1999, while the GEM findings suggest that there are rather few new 
firms in that sector. While its overall ' attrition profile' is average (9.7 per cent), it 
is very dramatic among private companies (46.3 per cent) . 
This could possibly be attributed to a discrepancy between the formal and informal 
sector, a high "infant mortality" rate leading to a much smaller number of living 
young companies than were created, and/or the re-registration of proprietary 
companies (Ptys) as close corporations (CCs), and the phenomenon of dormant 
companies.2 
Transport and communication: This sector consists of among others, activities 
such as ' 'telecommunications'' or ' 'tour operators/ travel agencies", which are 
known to be popular start-up activities - and also activities such as taxi driving. 
While GEM found a very high share of start-ups but not of new firms in that 
sector, the registration activity seems to have slightly slowed down in 1999-2000, 
especially for CCs. This may arise from a difference in the delimitation of the 
sectors or by the fact that while the communication and tourism sectors are 
beginning to be saturated, which shows up as a high infant mortality. This may 
have reduced the attractiveness of the sector for start-ups. 
Agriculture, Fishing and Hunting: The primary sector shows an intriguing 
pattern when comparing registrations in 2000 to the registration activity in 1990-
99. Undoubtedly, there has been a great acceleration in the registrations ofCCs in 
1999-2000. However, GEM does not corroborate this, as they found very few new 
firms in that sector. The hypothesis of a rather "old sector" is also confirmed by 
the low rate of attrition. It is difficult to correctly interpret these results without a 
study of the structural changes in agriculture as a whole. This would require 
knowing what proportion of agricultural businesses is registered as CCs or Private 
companies. In any case, the land reform process seems to be slowly generating 
some emerging farming businesses. 
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Notes: 
1. The ratio of deregistrations to registrations, which we call an "attrition rate", should 
not be seen as a proxy for a "mortality rate", which would be the ratio of deaths to the 
entire sector's population which is typically much lower. 
2. Examples of these are Black Economic Empowerment companies, which are 
registered for the purpose of winning government tenders, while in reality they are 
merely fronts for older white-owned firms. This trend has received widespread 
publicly and criticism. 
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2. Evidence of untapped potential in rural areas 
One limitation of the GEM methodology is that the business creation potential is self-
assessed, i.e., respondents are asked whether they believe that there are opportunities 
and that they would have the skills necessary to start a business. However, the results 
are intriguing, and suggestive of a huge untapped business potential in rural areas -
especially among black people. 
Table V-l : Untapped potential of "opportunity entrepreneurship " 
White Indian Coloured Black Metro· Small Town Rural Total 
"Potential opportunity 
entrepreneurs" • 7.0% 6.2% 8.1% 5.8% 6.3% 5.4% 6.0% 6.1 % 
Actual opportunity 
entrepreneurs 8.1% 6.2% 6.1% 2.6% 6.3% 3.8% 0.7% 3.7% 
Untapped potential -1.1 % 0.0% 2.0% 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 5.3% 2.4% 
No of adults -38,350 0 49.364 657.139 0 87.008 583.420 665,490 
Source: GEM 2001, combined with OHS data. Note - all percentage figures are percentages of the 
adult population within the category. 
Table V -1 shows that among urban and White and Indian populations, there is little or 
no potential for more entrepreneurship opportunity. On the other hand, it seems that, 
with the appropriate support (including probably (finance, infrastructure and 
mentoring), there could be a considerable increase in entrepreneurship in rural areas 
and among coloured and black people. This suggests that government policy should 
really endeavour to stimulate small business activity among those population groups. 
The second caveat is that the "potential opportunity entrepreneurs" are self-assessed. 
It is possible that, with their lack of exposure and business experience, rural and black 
South Africans over-estimate both the opportunities present on the market, and their 
own ability to start a business. 
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3. Angelfinance and Venture Capital as sources ofSMEfinance 
Business angel finance and venture capital are often viewed as an alternative to bank 
finance, especially for young "high-risk high return" companies, whose available 
collateral or equity resources are too low to qualify for a bank loan. 
As far as Business Angels are concerned, most recent statistics I suggest that in the last 
three years, approximately 1.1 per cent of South Africans have privately invested into 
firms that were not theirs. This is less than in most developed countries, but it 
suggests that the business angel culture is far from being insignificant. The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor evaluates the total amount of angel investment over the last 
three years at approximately RI billion. 
While there are very divergent estimations, KPMG's "2000 Private Equity Survey" 
seems to indicate that compared with the size of the economy. South Africa has one of 
the most vibrant venture capital and private equity markets, with more than R33 
billion under management (Table V -2). 
Table V-2 
Relative size of international private equity markets 
Value of private equity investments Asa% ofGDP 
(uS $ billion) 
USA 400.0 4.9% 
UK 27.6 2.3% 
Israel 10.4 12.1% 
."A 4.3 4.2% 
Netherlands 4 .2 1.3% 
Source: KPMG and the South AfrIcan Venture CapItal and Pnvate EqUIty AsSocIatIOn, "2000 Private 
Equity Survey", April 2001 
The venture capitaVprivate equity sector, hence, is not small in South Africa. But, 
considering that "private equity" includes all equity investments in non-listed 
companies, the size of the sector is not necessarily an indicator of the importance of 
equity as a source offinance for SMMEs. Although very little evidence is available in 
this area, there is a strong presumption that only a small portion is directed to SMMEs 
(presumably less than R5 billion). Especially, black SMMEs apparently received no 
more than R700 million of equity investment (Karungu et al., 2000). 
~ Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), South African Executive Report (2001: 32-33) 
Karungu, Dr. P., T. Nyandoro and Dr. M. Stettler, Venture Capital as a Source of 
Economic Empowerment in South Africa, March 2000 
96 
KNC and Associates2 have surveyed 213 black businesses, most of them being very 
small to small enterprises with a focus on the services sector. Firms were asked 
whether they had applied for venture capital funding and if so, whether they were 
successful. The results point at a lot of unsatisfied demand in the very low layers of 
the size range (Table V -3). 
Table V-3 
Firms' application for venture capital by size 
Size offinns (total Number offinns Appl ied for venture capital funding Received venture capital fund ing 
assets) (R million) 
Number In % offinns Number In % offinns which 
surveyed applied 
less than 0.5 m 120 18 15% I 5.5% 
0.5-2 mill ion 38 7 18% I 14% 
2-5 mill ion 9 2 22% I (50%), but not 
silffiificant 
Above 5 m 11 7 64% 3 43% 
Source: Karungu etal. (2000) 
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4. SMMEs low level of investment as a symtom of a financing problem 
Capital investments in new machinery and equipment were undertaken by 60 per cent 
ofthe SMMEs sampled by the World Bank, in both 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless, 
when accounting for a 10 per cent cut-offfor depreciation, only 38 per cent ofall 
SMMEs reported net investment increases in 1998, and 32 per cent in 1999. 
The SMME survey asked firms which had planned, but not undertaken new 
investments for their reasons. While 39 per cent of the sample SMMEs considered 
new investments in 1998, one-third did not realise their plans. The main reasons 
provided not implementing planned investment in 1998 are shown in Table V -4. 
Table V-4 
Reasons for firms not undertaking planned investment in 1998, by percentage 
Sizet Size 2 Size 3 Black Asian/ White 
Coloured 
Lack of access to capital 26 26 14 59 32 16 
Interest rates too high 7 11 16 6 7 10 
lnsufficient demand 28 28 37 16 32 30 
No need/desire 18 16 16 12 11 21 
Insufficient business experience 14 12 2 6 12 10 
Business costs too high 1 1 2 0 2 1 
High labour costs 1 1 3 0 0 2 
Other 5 6 9 0 4 9 
Source: Chandra et al (2001) 
On average, poor business conditions pre-empt the need for capital investment and 
seem to be a far more critical explanation than limited access to capital markets or 
high costs of credit. Nevertheless, limited access to capital markets played a very 
significant role, and especially prevented micro and black-run SMMEs from 
expanding. In addition, there are good reasons to believe that these results understate 
the role offinancing constraints in low investment levels. 
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Appendix VI 
SA veA's Full member association with SMEs 
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Table VI-I: SAVCA's Full member association with SMEs 












source of investment 
(R m) 
funds size 
(YIN) (R millions) 
I African Harvest Capital - - N 1 - M ining, agriculture, property Technology, media, telecomms, 
service industries 
2 Aquila Growth Ltd - 250 Y 0 28 Mining, high working capital and capex Gaming, tourism, IT, media, FMCG, retail, 
intensive industries telecomms, electronics 
3 BoE Investment Partners - 264 N 0.5 10 Hotel s, commodities, agriculture IT, sport and leisure, telecoms, 
financial services 
4 Business Partners - Central 310 268 Y 0.15 1.1 Agriculture and on-lending None 
5 Business Partners - East 324 324 Y 0.15 0.55 AgricultUre and on-lending None 
6 Business Partners - South 290 220 Y O.IS 0.7 Agriculture and on-lend ing None 
7 Business Partners - West 300 221 Y 0.15 0.409 Agriculture and on-lending None 
! 
8 Business Partners - Ventures I 100 34 Y I 3.1 Agriculture and on-lending None 
9 Cycad Financial Holdings Ltd 107 163 Y I 12 Property, mining, agriculture IT . 
10 Gensec Bank - Archway l·lO 96 N 0.5 8 All except IT & related industries IT & related industries 
Venture Partners Trust 
11 Gensec Bank - Archway 160 19 N 0.5 8 All except IT, telecoms and media IT , telecoms and media 
Technology Venture 
12 Gensec Bank - Biotechnology 80 - N I - All except Biotechnology Bioteclmology 
Fund 
, 13 Global Capital - - y 0.5 Property, construction, mining None l -
I 
14 Greenfie1ds Venture Capital - - N 0.15 - - Property, liquor, gambling, tobacco 
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(Rm) to da te at 




source of inves tment 
(Rm) 
funds size 
(YIN) (R millions) 
15 HBD Venture Capital 70 17 Y 0.25 5 None Any industry 
16 Horizon Equity Partners - US$20 - N 2 10 .Property, agriculture, armaments IT, e-comm, telecoms, electronics, Jife 
MCA Investments million sciences, mining technology, specialist 
engineering products . 
17 Horizon Equity Partners - 150 120 N 2 10 Property, agriculture, armaments IT, e-comm, telecoms, electronics, life 
Technology VC Fund sciences, mining technology, specialist 
i 
engineering products 
18- Industrial Development 612 27.5 N 2 - None Technology, empowerment 
22 Corporation of SA (IDC) 
23 Lireas Holdings - 40.6 N 0.1 1 All except Financial services Financial Services 
24 NEF Venture Fund 200 - N 0.25 - None None 
25 NewFarmers Development Co. 51.4 58 Y 1 5 All except agribusiness Agribusiness 
26 PointBreak (Pty) Ltd - - - 0 2 None High growth industries 
27 Rock-IT Private Equity 120 - Y - - Al l except IT and telecoms IT and telecoms 
I 28 Venfin Limited - - N 400 Non-technology Technology 
! 
-
29 Venture Capital Managers 83 73 N 0.5 3 Builing, armaments, tobacco Manufacture and technology 
30 Viking Investments and 160 - Y 0.05 - Agriculture. None 
Asset Management 
---_ .. -
Source: SA VCA Directory 2002 
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Appendix VII 
SAVCA's Associate member association with SMEs 
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Table VJI-J 
No Name Type of firm Core Services 
1 Andersen Axis Corporate finance 
2 Audax Ideas Business & • Consulting on business strategy 
Management Consulting corporate strategy projects 
• Facilitating executive education 
programmes 
• Advising businesses on VC 
financing 
3 Cape Chamber of Chamber of Provides extensive networking activities 
Commerce & Industry Commerce to businesses 
4 Cinergi Group Financial Services Cinergi Asset Managers - provides 
Group advisory service to small and medium 
sized VC/private equity funds 
Cinergi Corporate Finance - provides 
advisory services to small & medium 
sized companies and entrepreneurs to raise 
capital to finance growth and expansion, 
MBO's or MBI's 
5 Chrysalis Biotechnology Industry specific Providing equity capital, strategic and 
Holdings Ltd investment firm operational support to biotechnology 
operating companies 
6 Deloitte & Touche Multi-disciplinary The Entrepreneur Services and Corporate 
professional services Finance divisions provide clients (SMEs 
firm & investors) with Multi-disciplinary 
professional services 
7 Development Bank of Development Provides finance and technical assistance 
Southern Africa Finance Institution for infrastructure in the Southern African 
region 
8 Eccles Associates lnc Financial Services 
Provides consulting and corporate 
finances services 
Specialises in raising capital (debt & equity) 
for fast growing businesses 
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9 European Private Equity Trade Association 
& Venture Capital 
Lobbying and campaigning organisation 
and by providing a wide range of 
Association (EVCA) 
information services 
Creating extensive network 
opportunities through the organisation of 
conferences, workshops, working 
committees and other discussion forums 
10 Firm Capital Private equity and 
venture capital 
Advises management and business 
advisors 
owners on the development of their 
business including the opportunities to 
access capital 
Engineer innovative empowerment 
structures in the pursuit of growth and 
capital 
I1 Fisher Hof'finan PKF Accountants and 
(Jhb) Inc auditors 
Provides personal relationships with 
clients (SMEs) 
12 Go Capital Capital raising! Working with management teams to raise 
Deal-making! capital. Activities include: 
strategy • Strategy analysis and development 
• Financial modelling and analysis 
• Fundraising strategy development 
• Investor networking 
• Roadshow support and presentation 
• Deal structuring and process support 
13 Grant Thomton Kessel Accountants, 
Feinstein auditors and 
Adding value to clients businesses 
business advisors 
(entrepreneurial and fast growing) 
14 JPMorgan Investment bankers 
Is the firm's principal vehicle for private 
equity investing and provides equity and 
mezzanine finance to companies around 
the world 
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15 Khula Enterprise Wholesale financier 
Finance Limited 
Creating access to equity finance for 
SMEs owned primarily by PDrs where 
there exists a possibility of a positive 
ROI coupled with job creation . Deal 
sizes are between R250k and R2500k 
16 KPMG Accountants, 
auditors and 
Services for companies seeking fmance 
business advisors 
include: 
• Fund raising 
• Advising MBO teams 
• Preparation of business plans 
17 Omega Investment Venture capital 
Research (Pty) Limited solutions provider 
Offering input to aspiring high growth 
companies via formal and informal 
relationships broadly encompassing the 
following services: 
• Research, information and guidance 
• Project appraisals 
• Business plan guidance 
• Strategic planning 
• Due diligence and capital raising 
• Project management and corporate 
advisory services 
• Technology partnering and 
development 
• Networking and added value 
18 PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate finance 
and private equity Offer clients comprehensive specialist 




Special areas of interest (to the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist) 
include incubation of technological 
innovative companies. 
Entrepreneurs are selected, trained and 
mentored 
Shares risk through equity, long-term 
loans and short-term loan investment 
20 The Corner House (Pty) Corporate advisor 
Limited services 
Corporate advisor services 
21 The Janus Corporation Investment banking Dollar based closed ended fund that invests 
(Pty) Limited (R3 - 25 million) in: 
• Tourism 
• Management and financial services 
• Innovative intern et or e-commerce 
• Health 
• Retail 
22 The JSE Securities Securities exchange 
Exchange SA 
Provides an orderly market for dealing 
in securities. Will launch AltEx in Oct 
2003 - listing of SMEs 
23 Webber Wentzel Attorneys 
Bowens 
Provides specialised legal services to the 
private equity industry 
Source: SA YCA Drrectory 2002 
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Appendix VIII 
Evaluating the impact of business introduction 
services - Informal Venture Capital 
Harrison, R. Mason, C. 1996. 
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Evaluating the impact of business introduction services - Informal Venture Capital 
(Synopsis) 
A significant element in the underdevelopment of the VC market is the existence of 
inefficiencies, which limit its potential role in financing SMEs. Most informal 
investors want to invest more, but cannot find sufficient investment opportunities, 
which meet their investment criteria; entrepreneurs seeking capital also experience 
difficulty in identifYing potential informal investors. In the absence of effective 
channels for investors and entrepreneurs to make contact with each other, and in view 
of the considerable time to search for and appraise investment opportunities, 
combined with the fact that for most investors it is a spare-time activity, investors 
generally adopt an ad hoc, unscientific and passive approach, relying heavily on 
friends and business associates for referrals. Equally, informal investors comprise an 
unorganised, fragmented and, because of their desire for anonymity, largely invisible 
market which makes them very difficult to identify by entrepreneurs seeking private 
sources of venture capital. 
Although market inefficiency is characteristic of all countries, there is evidence to 
suggest that its severity is even greater outside the USA. A comparison of the 
informal venture capital market in the USA and the UK (Harrison and Mason, 1992a) 
indicates that the inefficiencies which characterise the market in the UK are 
compounded as a result of three factors: first, less effective information networks 
leading to lower-quality information on investment opportunities and more redundant 
information; second, generally less experienced and less sophisticated investors; and 
third, the limited involvement ofUK informal investors in investment syndicates. 
These three factors are in turn reflected in the significantly higher deal flow received 
by UK informal investors and their lower investment rate compared to their US 
equivalents, and the higher proportions ofUK informal investors who are unable to 
find enough deals and are dissatisfied with existing channels of communication with 
businesses seeking finance. 
The establishment of business introduction services, to provide such channels of 
communication, represents one effective way of overcoming the sources of 
inefficiency in the informal venture market represented by the invisibility of informal 
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investors, the fragmented nature of the market and the high search costs for businesses 
seeking investors and investors seeking investment opportunities. Such services will 
enable entrepreneurs to bring their investment proposals to the attention of a number 
of private investors simultaneously, and provides investors with a convenient means 
of identifying and examining a range of investment proposals while retaining their 
anonymity until they are ready to enter negotiations with an entrepreneur. 
However, five groups of economic benefits arising from the establishment of effective 
well-resourced business introduction services can be identified. First, these services 
facilitate introductions and matches between investors and entrepreneurs, which raise 
the overall level of informal investment activity. Second, these services provide firms, 
and to a lesser extent investors, with business advice, counselling and signposting 
services which are of value in their own right, even where investments are not made. 
Third, as most informal investors are hands-on investors, investments facilitated by 
these services bring access to a potentially wide range of other investor inputs such as 
know-how, contacts, advice and consultancy. Fourth, the secondary effects, or 
collateral benefits, of investments facilitated by business introduction services 
including the firm's ability to raise additional equity or loan finance on the strength of 
the initial investment, may be significant, and in many cases may outweigh the direct 
investment. Fifth, the operation of a business introduction service, by mobilising what 
would otherwise be fragmented and invisible sources of risk capital to make them 
accessible to small businesses, contributes to awareness raising amongst investors, 
businesses and professional and support networks of informal venture capital issues. 
Taking all of these value-added impacts into account, the evidence collected in this 
volume confirms that business introduction services are a worthwhile and beneficial 
experiment. 
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